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STRADDLING THE COLUMBIA: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW PROFESSOR’S MUSINGS ON CIRCUMVENTING 
WASHINGTON STATE’S CRIMINAL PROHIBITION ON 
COMPENSATED SURROGACY 
Peter Nicolas∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
I have spent most of my professional life as a law professor at the 
University of Washington specializing in constitutional law, yet when 
asked as a child what I wanted to be when I grew up, neither “lawyer” 
nor “professor” rolled off my tongue. Instead, when queried by adults or 
other children, I succinctly and matter-of-factly stated that I wanted to be 
a “mommy.” At that young age, I only had two primary role models: my 
mother, who at the time was a full-time mommy, and my father, who 
was a doctor. My squeamishness about blood and guts certainly made 
being a “mommy” the natural default choice. 
I was, of course, teased a bit by my contemporaries for my gender-
bending choice of a career path and told by adults that only girls could 
be mommies. Indeed, when I was growing up even young girls were 
encouraged to think about a future that included something other than 
motherhood. To avoid unwelcome future attention to myself I was thus 
quickly socialized to suppress my desire to “mother” children. As I grew 
older and came to the self-realization that I was gay, these early life 
lessons likewise counseled in favor of keeping that little bit of 
information to myself as well. 
I soon learned that the combined forces of law and biology together 
served as significant roadblocks for a gay man interested in becoming a 
legal parent to a child. The law in many states has long been hostile to 
gay parenting, with some states prohibiting adoption in the first instance 
by gay individuals1 or same-sex couples,2 and other states prohibiting 
∗ Jeffrey & Susan Brotman Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Gender, Women & Sexuality 
Studies, University of Washington. I wish to thank Anna Endter, Grace Feldman, and Cheryl R. 
Nyberg of the University of Washington Gallagher Law Library for their invaluable research 
assistance. 
1. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.); Act of May 25, 
1987, ch. 343, 1987 N.H. LAWS 379.  
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so-called second-parent adoption, whereby one same-sex partner adopts 
the natural or adopted child of the other.3 Moreover, neither I nor my 
future partner could be a “mother” in the gestational or genetic sense of 
the word since as men we lack two critical ingredients for creating 
human life, wombs and eggs.4 Thus, if I was to achieve my goal of 
becoming a “mother” in the nurturing sense of that word,5 I was going to 
need the assistance of one or more women. I thus ventured into the 
complex legal and medical world of becoming a parent through the 
assistance of a surrogate and an egg donor. 
In this Article, I recount—through both the prisms of an intended 
parent and a constitutional law scholar—my successful efforts to 
become a parent via compensated surrogacy and egg donation. Part I of 
this Article provides a narrative of my experience in becoming a parent 
via compensated surrogacy, and the various state and federal legal 
roadblocks and deterrents that I encountered along the way, including 
Washington State’s criminal prohibition on compensated surrogacy as 
well as federal guidelines issued by the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration regarding the use of sperm by gay donors in the process 
of in vitro fertilization. Part II of this Article considers the extent to 
which laws that criminalize or otherwise restrict one’s ability to enter 
into surrogacy arrangements run afoul of either the substantive 
protections of the Due Process Clause or the guarantees of the Equal 
Protection Clause. Part III of this Article considers the extent to which 
laws that stand in the way of intended parents establishing legal 
parentage of children born via surrogacy violate those same 
constitutional guarantees. 
I conclude that laws that restrict one’s ability to enter into surrogacy 
arrangements violate both the long-recognized fundamental right to 
procreate6 as well as a more specifically articulated fundamental right to 
2. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg., 1st, and 2d 
Extraordinary Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-2-301(c) (West, Westlaw through ch. 1–117 2014 
Reg. Sess.); Adoption of Meaux, 417 So. 2d 522, 523 (La. Ct. App. 1982); In re Adams, 473 
N.W.2d 712, 714 (Mich. 1991); In re Adoption of M.C.D., 42 P.3d 873, 878 (Okla. Civ. App. 
2001); In re Guardianship of O.G.M-K., 787 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010). 
3. See S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 822 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008); In re Adoption of Luke, 640 
N.W.2d 374, 383 (Neb. 2002); Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 502 (N.C. 2010); In re Bonfield, 
780 N.E.2d 241, 247 (Ohio 2002); In re Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Wis. 
1994). 
4. One of us, of course, could by providing sperm serve as the genetic father to a child. 
5. For an excellent overview of the ways in which men can be mothers in this sense, see Darren 
Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 57 
(2012). 
6. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
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procreate with the assistance of third parties, while laws that stand in the 
way of intended parents establishing legal parentage of children born via 
surrogacy violate the fundamental right to care for and have custody of 
one’s children.7 In addition, I demonstrate that some of these restrictive 
statutory schemes can also be challenged on the ground that they violate 
the equal protection rights not only of those seeking to have children via 
surrogacy, but also the children born to them. 
I. MY JOURNEY TO PARENTHOOD VIA COMPENSATED 
SURROGACY 
A. Criminalizing Commercial Surrogacy: The Washington State 
Approach 
After graduating from law school and clerking for a federal judge, I 
had the good fortune of relocating to Seattle, Washington after securing 
a teaching job at the University of Washington School of Law. During 
the years I have lived in Washington, the state legislature enacted a 
series of laws designed to further the rights of sexual minorities, 
including a statewide antidiscrimination law,8 a statewide domestic 
partnership registry,9 and ultimately, a state law extending full marriage 
rights to same-sex couples.10 
After my then-domestic partner (now husband) and I had been 
together for a decade, we began to explore the possibility of becoming 
parents via surrogacy. We learned that there were two types of 
surrogacy, traditional and gestational. With traditional surrogacy, the 
surrogate allows her eggs to be artificially inseminated with the sperm of 
an intended father, with the result being that the surrogate has not only a 
gestational but also a genetic connection to the resulting child.11 In 
contrast, with gestational surrogacy an embryo is created through the 
process of in vitro fertilization using the eggs of another woman, either 
7. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
8. See Act of Jan. 31, 2006, ch. 4, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 12 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 49.60.030 (2012)). 
9. See Act of Apr. 21, 2007, ch. 156, 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws 616 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 26.60.010–26.60.070, (2012)). 
10. See Act of Feb. 13, 2012, ch. 3, 2012 Wash. Sess. Laws 199 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 26.04.010–2604.070).  
11. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); In re 
C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 720 (Tenn. 2005); In re Paternity of F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 643 (Wis. 
2013). 
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those of the intended mother or a third-party egg donor. This embryo is 
implanted in the surrogate, who subsequently gives birth to a child to 
whom she has no genetic connection.12 We also learned that either type 
of surrogacy arrangement could be either “altruistic” or 
“uncompensated” on the one hand or “commercial” or “compensated” 
on the other. With altruistic surrogacy, the surrogate receives no 
compensation (save for that necessary to cover any expenses associated 
with the pregnancy and birth), while with commercial surrogacy the 
surrogate receives a fee for serving as a surrogate.13 Altruistic surrogacy 
often involves a close friend or family member serving as a surrogate, 
while commercial surrogacy involves a person that the intended parents 
met solely for the purpose of arranging a surrogate birth. 
While trying to wrap our heads around the different types of 
surrogacy, we were surprised to learn that, despite the otherwise 
favorable legal atmosphere for same-sex couples in Washington State, 
Washington law not only renders compensated surrogacy contracts 
unenforceable,14 but actually makes it a crime to enter into them.15 
Specifically, under Washington law, entering into such contracts is a 
“gross misdemeanor”16 punishable by up to 364 days in prison and a fine 
of up to $5,000.17 Moreover, custody of the child born via the surrogacy 
arrangement would be left to the discretion and uncertainty of a judge 
applying a multi-factored statutory test.18 Uncompensated surrogacy, in 
contrast, is not a crime under Washington law. In 2011, when we were in 
the midst of exploring surrogacy, the Washington House of 
Representatives voted in favor of a bill that would have decriminalized 
surrogacy, regulated and provided for the enforcement of gestational 
surrogacy agreements, and left traditional surrogacy arrangements 
unregulated.19 However, the bill failed to advance in the Washington 
Senate. Thus, unless someone within the state was willing to serve as a 
surrogate for us without being compensated for her efforts, a rather 
unlikely—and in my mind, unreasonable—prospect, we had to look 
outside of the state in search of a jurisdiction with a more favorable legal 
12. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894; In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d at 720; In 
re Paternity of F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 643. 
13. See In re Paternity of F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 657 & n.10. 
14. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.240 (2012). 
15. See id. §§ 26.26.230–26.26.250. 
16. See id. § 26.26.250. 
17. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.020 (2012). 
18. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.260. 
19. See H.B. 1267, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011). 
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atmosphere for surrogacy. 
B. A Legal Patchwork: A Survey of the Law of Surrogacy in the 
United States 
Since pursuing surrogacy in our home state was not an option, we had 
to select another state or country in which to pursue surrogacy. For us, 
the key consideration was to select a jurisdiction with favorable laws on 
the issue, or, if not favorable, at least not hostile to surrogacy. 
There are a handful of foreign countries where compensated 
surrogacy is lawful, far less expensive than in the United States, and that 
cater to foreigners, including India, Thailand, and Mexico.20 Yet, even if 
we were willing to overlook our desire that the surrogate live close 
enough to us that we could attend key appointments and the birth of our 
future child, there were other reasons to pursue surrogacy domestically. 
For starters, the child would be considered born “out of wedlock” to a 
U.S. father and a foreign mother. Under U.S. immigration laws, 
establishing U.S. citizenship for such a child is somewhat more 
complicated than for a child born out-of-wedlock to a U.S. mother or “in 
wedlock” to an opposite-sex U.S. couple.21 Second, judgments of 
parentage in sister states are entitled to Full Faith and Credit under the 
U.S. Constitution even in states that otherwise would not permit same-
sex parentage of a child to be established in the first instance.22 In 
contrast, recognition of a judgment of parentage from a foreign country 
(if one were even available) would be recognized only at the discretion 
of each individual U.S. state.23 
Having turned our focus stateside, we were still faced with a wide 
spectrum of legal regimes from which to choose.24 We discovered that 
20. See Tamar Lewin, Coming to U.S. for Baby, and Womb to Carry It, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2014, 
at A1. India has since modified its laws so as to permit only married opposite-sex couples to pursue 
surrogacy there. See India Bans Gay Foreign Couples from Surrogacy, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 18, 2013, 
2:57 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/9811222/India-bans-gay-foreign-
couples-from-surrogacy.html. 
21. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2012). These laws have been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court 
despite their sex-based classifications. See Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001). 
22. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Baker by Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232–
33 (1998); Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1151–56 (10th Cir. 2007); Henry v. Himes, No. 
1:14–CV–129, 2014 WL 1418395, at *17, 18 n.24 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2014), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, Nos.14-1341, 3057, 3464, 5291, 5297, 5818, 2014 WL 
5748990 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2014); Embry v. Ryan, 11 So. 3d 408, 409–10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
23. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190 (1912). 
24. We were engaged in the process of selecting a state in which to pursue surrogacy in 2011 and 
2012, but there have since been some significant changes in state laws. The overview that follows 
presents the current state of affairs rather than the precise state of affairs in 2011 and 2012 to make 
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state laws governing surrogacy can be divided into roughly six 
categories, ranging from criminalization of surrogacy at one extreme to 
detailed laws providing for the full enforceability of surrogacy 
agreements at the other and a variety of other approaches—including no 
substantive law one way or the other on the issue—in between. 
Balancing our desire for legal certainty against competing 
considerations, we ultimately selected one of the in-between 
jurisdictions whose substantive law was neither hostile nor clearly 
favorable to surrogacy arrangements. 
The first group of states to be crossed off the list were those on one 
extreme that, like Washington,25 not only declared all contracts for 
compensated surrogacy unenforceable but made entering into any such 
contracts a punishable civil or criminal offense.26 This included 
Michigan,27 New York,28 and Washington, D.C.29 Also off the list were 
a second set of states that, while not making compensated surrogacy 
arrangements a punishable offense, had statutes or case law declaring 
surrogacy contracts to be unenforceable. This included Arizona,30 
Indiana,31 Nebraska,32 and New Jersey,33 and for traditional surrogacy 
it of greater utility to researchers as well as those currently considering surrogacy. 
25. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.230–26.26.250 (2012). 
26. Excluded from this list are states, such as Kentucky, Maryland, and Oklahoma that 
criminalize only compensated traditional surrogacy. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (West, 
Westlaw through 2014 legislation); In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 130–31 (Md. 2007); Family 
Law: Adoption—Although Surrogacy Contract Involving Payment of Fee to Birth Mother Is Illegal 
and Unenforceable Under Maryland Law, Invalid Payments Do Not Bar Approval of Adoption 
Petition, 85 Op. Md. Att’y Gen. 348, 366 n.22 (2000); Is a Surrogate Gestation Contract a Violation 
of Oklahoma’s Trafficking in Children Statutes?, 83 Op. Okla. Att’y Gen. 162 (1983). Also 
excluded from the list is Virginia, which does not criminalize surrogacy but does make it a crime for 
third parties who facilitate such contracts to earn a fee. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (West, 
Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. & 2014 Special Sess.). 
27. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.859 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. Act 282) 
(mandating up to one year in prison and $10,000 fine for contracting parties, and up to five years in 
prison and $50,000 fine for third parties facilitating such contracts). 
28. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–123 (McKinney, Westlaw through 2014 legislation) 
(imposing $500 civil penalty for those entering into them, with greater civil and criminal penalties 
for third parties facilitating such contracts). 
29. See D.C. CODE §§ 16-401, 16-402 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 1, 2014) (imposing up to 
one year in prison and $10,000 fine for anyone involved in the contracting process). 
30. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(A) (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. & Special Sess. 
2014). 
31. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-20-1-1, 31-20-1-2 (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. and 2d 
Technical Sess. 2014). 
32. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21,200 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
33. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988); A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 952–
54 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). 
 
                                                     
13 - Nicolas_Final for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/16/20146:32 PM 
2014] STRADDLING THE COLUMBIA 1241 
contracts only, Louisiana34 and North Dakota.35 Many of the states in 
this second group have statutory provisions that take the further step of 
explicitly declaring the surrogate to be the legal mother and—if she is 
married—her husband the legal father,36 thus complicating the 
establishment of legal parentage. 
A third group of states had laws somewhat more favorable to 
surrogacy arrangements, but these states overregulate the process to the 
point that surrogacy is not a realistic option in those states for many 
people. Specifically, Florida,37 Texas,38 Utah,39 and Virginia40 have 
detailed statutes making surrogacy agreements entered into that satisfy 
the statutes’ requirements valid and enforceable, but they contain various 
provisions that make them of limited utility for most couples. For 
example, the Florida41 and Virginia42 statutes do not apply to agreements 
that provide compensation beyond expenses related to the surrogacy 
process.43 The Virginia statute requires that a “home study”—a typical 
requirement for people seeking to adopt a child—be done of both the 
surrogate and the intended parents.44 Furthermore, in Texas45 and 
34. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
35. See Assisted Conception Act, ch. 184, § 5, 1989 N.D. Laws 562 (1989) (codified at N.D. 
CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-18-05 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.)). 
36. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(B)–(C) (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. & 
Special Sess. 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-18-05 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
37. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.). 
38. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.751–160.763 (West, Westlaw through 3d Called Sess. 
2013). 
39. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-801 to 78B-15-809 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Gen. 
Sess.). 
40. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to 20-165 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. & 2014 
Special Sess.).  
41. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(4) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.). The statute, 
however, allows for compensation for “living” expenses, which some interpret as allowing you to 
pay for the surrogate’s monthly rent or mortgage and similar expenses during the pregnancy in an 
amount that often parallels the compensation given to surrogates in states where there are no 
restrictions on compensation. See, e.g., Gestational Surrogacy: Price List (2014), 
DREAMABABY.COM, http://www.dreamababy.com/downloads/Gestational%20Surrogacy%20Price 
%20List.pdf (last visited July 16, 2014); Intended Parents and Parents Via Surrogacy: IP in 
Florida—”No Compensation”?, ALLABOUTSURROGACY.COM, http://www.allaboutsurrogacy. 
com/forums/index.php?showtopic=55448 (last visited July 12, 2014). 
42. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156, 20-160(B)(4), 20-162(A) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. 
Sess. & 2014 Special Sess.). 
43. See, e.g., Gestational Surrogacy: Price List (2014), supra note 41 (describing “living 
expenses”). 
44. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160. 
45. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.756 (West, Westlaw through 3d Called Sess. 2013). 
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Virginia,46 the agreement is enforceable only if pre-approved by a court. 
These statutes also contain a variety of other requirements for a 
surrogacy contract to be valid, such as proof that surrogacy is a medical 
necessity for the intended parents,47 that the surrogate has had at least 
one prior pregnancy and delivery,48 a minimum age of the participants,49 
informed consent of medical risks for the surrogate,50 psychological 
evaluations of the participants,51 and the like.52 
A fourth group of states have enacted statutory provisions that 
facilitate parentage determinations where surrogacy is involved by either 
explicitly providing that the intended parents are the legal parents or 
explicitly providing a mechanism for amending birth certificates where 
surrogacy arrangements are involved. This includes Arkansas,53 
Connecticut,54 North Dakota55 and for uncompensated surrogacy only, 
Washington.56 But these statutes otherwise do not provide detail on the 
requirements, if any, for an enforceable surrogacy contract.57 
46. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160. 
47. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(2) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 160.756(b)(2); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2014 
Gen. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(8). 
48. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(f); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.756(b)(5); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(6). 
49. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1) (eighteen years); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801(2)(i) 
(twenty-one years). 
50. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754(d). 
51. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(d); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(7). 
52. In addition to these various limitations, these statutes also require that the couple be in a 
legally recognized marriage. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 
§ 160.754(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801(3); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156, 20-159 (defining 
“Intended parents”). At the time we were pursuing surrogacy, these states all had constitutional 
amendments refusing to permit or recognize same-sex marriages. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27; TEX. 
CONST. art. I, § 32; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29; VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A. Given recent decisions 
declaring that these state constitutional amendments violate the federal constitution, see Kitchen v. 
Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1213 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014); De Leon v. 
Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 639–40 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014), this limitation is no longer of consequence for same-
sex couples pursuing surrogacy in these states. 
53. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Extraordinary Sess.). 
54. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-48(a) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.). The 
Connecticut provision encompasses gestational surrogacy only. 
55. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01, 14-18-08 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). The 
North Dakota provision encompasses gestational surrogacy only. 
56. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.101(1), (8) (2012). 
57. See, e.g., Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 785 n.4 (Conn. 2011) (leaving open what the 
requirements are for an enforceable contract). 
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A fifth group of states—California,58 Delaware,59 Illinois,60 Nevada,61 
and New Hampshire,62—go the furthest in providing for the enforcement 
and facilitation of gestational surrogacy contracts. Unlike the statutes in 
some of the states that make surrogacy contracts enforceable but heavily 
regulate them, these statutes do not require court pre-approval of the 
agreement. The California statute has the most modest requirements, 
essentially requiring only that the parties be represented by separate 
legal counsel,63 while the Nevada statute is nearly as hands-off, 
requiring only separate legal representation64 and a medical evaluation 
of the surrogate.65 The Delaware, Illinois, and New Hampshire statutes 
contain a variety of requirements in addition to representation by 
separate legal counsel66 and medical evaluation of the surrogate,67 such 
as that the surrogate be at least twenty-one years old,68 have given birth 
to one child,69 and undergone a mental health evaluation,70 and that the 
intended parents have undergone a mental health evaluation.71 In 
addition, the Delaware and Illinois statutes require that the surrogate 
have health insurance,72 and the Illinois statute specifies that at least one 
58. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West, Westlaw though 2014 Reg. Sess. ch. 531). Prior 
California case law had declared such contracts to be enforceable. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 
784–85 (Cal. 1993). 
59. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-801 to 8-813 (West, Westlaw through 2014 ch. 428). 
60. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 1–75 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. Act 98-
925). 
61. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 126.710–126.810 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. & 
Special Sess.). 
62. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1 to 168-B:21 (West, Westlaw through ch. 330 of 2014 
Reg. Sess.). 
63. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962. 
64. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.740(1)(b), (2). 
65. See id. § 126.740(1)(a). 
66. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-806(a)(5), (b)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2014 ch. 428); 750 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(a)(5), (b)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. Act 98-925); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:9(V). 
67. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-806(a)(3); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(a)(3); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:9(III). 
68. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-806(a)(1); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(a)(1); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:9(I). 
69. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-806(a)(2); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(a)(2); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:9(II). 
70. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-806(a)(4); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(a)(4); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:9(IV). 
71. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-806(b)(1); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(b)(3); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:8(I). 
72. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-806(a)(6); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(a)(6). 
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of the intended parents provide the gametes73 and that there is a medical 
necessity for pursuing surrogacy.74 Assuming the statutory requirements 
are satisfied, the statutes in these five states allow for a pre-birth order, 
or “PBO,” whereby the legal parentage of the intended parents is 
determined in a proceeding that takes place before the child is born.75 
Moreover, like many of the states in the fourth group, these states have 
statutory provisions declaring that the intended parents, not the surrogate 
and her husband, are the child’s legal parents.76 
In the remaining states, the legislatures have taken no position on the 
enforceability of surrogacy agreements. In two states—New Mexico77 
and Tennessee78—the legislatures have taken the unusual step of 
enacting statutes declaring this official neutrality. In the other states, the 
legislature has either enacted no statutes whatsoever on the subject or 
only enacted statutes addressing discrete issues, such as statutes 
declaring that surrogacy arrangements do not violate state criminal 
statutes prohibiting baby selling79 or statutes addressing intestate 
succession where surrogacy is involved.80 In some of these states, courts 
have issued opinions declaring or strongly implying that surrogacy 
contracts are enforceable, including Maryland,81 Massachusetts,82 
Ohio,83 Pennsylvania,84 Tennessee,85 and Wisconsin,86 although what 
73. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(b)(1). 
74. See id. at 47 / 20(b)(2). 
75. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(e) (West, Westlaw though 2014 Reg. Sess. ch. 531); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 13, § 8-611(b); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 35; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.720(4) 
(West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. & Special Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:12. 
76. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(f)(1); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-804; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 47 / 15; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.670; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:5, 7. 
77. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-801 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.). 
78. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.). 
79. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 710.11 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 163.537 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-14h(e)(3) 
(West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Extraordinary Sess.). 
80. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-121 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.1-201, 524.2-120, 524.2-121 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-121 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.). 
81. See In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 131 (Md. 2007). 
82. See Hodas v. Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320, 324–27 (Mass. 2004); Culliton v. Beth Isr. Deaconess 
Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1137–38 (Mass. 2001). 
83. See J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Ohio 2007); S.N. v. M.B., 935 N.E.2d 463, 471 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2010). The Ohio courts have left open, however, the question whether traditional (as 
contrasted with gestational) surrogacy agreements are enforceable. See J.F., 879 N.E.2d at 742. 
84. See J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). 
85. See In re Baby, No. M2012-01040-SC-R11-JV, 2014 WL 4815211, at *20 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 
2014). 
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exactly is required for such an agreement to be enforceable is not 
entirely clear. 
All other states in this final group occupy a sort of “No Man’s (or in 
this case, perhaps more appropriately “Woman’s”) Land” in which 
surrogacy contracts are neither clearly enforceable nor clearly 
unenforceable. In these states, the extent to which courts will assist in 
the process—such as by issuing PBOs—is not something that you can 
find by simply doing a Westlaw or LexisNexis search because there 
have been no cases that have resulted in binding appellate court 
decisions on the enforceability of surrogacy contracts. Rather, surrogacy 
in these states occurs in the shadows, so to speak, with intended parents 
and surrogates working in conjunction with a small group of experienced 
attorneys and trial court judges to facilitate such arrangements. 
Given this national state of affairs, the closest state with the most 
favorable legal environment for surrogacy was California. Yet while 
relatively close, realistically it was too far away to allow for regularly 
attending key appointments, and certainly too far to get to quickly on 
short notice for an unexpectedly early birth. Moreover, the estimated 
costs for pursuing gestational surrogacy in California using one of its 
more popular agencies is $150,000 or more, and that assumes everything 
goes right on one’s first try.87 If we had unlimited resources and the 
money was mostly going to the people doing the hardest and riskiest 
work—the surrogate and the egg donor—it would be worth the cost to 
become a parent. But with only twenty-five percent of that amount going 
to those two individuals, it was a good deal primarily for the surrogacy 
agencies, doctors, lawyers, pharmacies, and psychologists involved in 
the process.88 These intermediaries do important work and deserve to be 
reasonably compensated for it, but the ratio struck me as a bit off. With 
California off the list and the other states with positive law too far away 
to meet our criteria, we started to take a look at one of the states where 
surrogacy occurs in the shadows closer to home, in Oregon. 
86. See In re Paternity of F.T.R., 888 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Wis. 2013). 
87. See Cost of Hiring a Surrogate, GROWING GENERATIONS, http://www.growinggenerations.com/ 
surrogacy-program/intended-parents/surrogacy-cost/ (last visited July 14, 2014). 
88. See, e.g., Egg Donation: Compensation, GROWING GENERATIONS, 
http://www.growinggenerations.com/egg-donor-program/egg-donors/egg-donor-pay/ (last visited 
July 14, 2014); Cost of Hiring a Surrogate, supra note 87; Surrogacy: Compensation, GROWING 
GENERATIONS, http://www.growinggenerations.com/surrogacy-program/surrogates/surrogate- 
mother-pay/ (last visited July 14, 2014). See generally Lewin, supra note 20, at A1. At the time we 
were engaged in the surrogacy process, the fee paid to the surrogate was several thousand dollars 
lower. 
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C. Surrogacy in the Shadows: The Oregon Approach 
The largest city in Oregon—Portland—is located just across the 
border from Washington State and in good traffic is just under a three-
hour drive away from Seattle. It is located in between California and 
Washington State not only geographically but, so far as surrogacy goes, 
legally. There are no statutes or court decisions addressing the 
enforceability of surrogacy contracts or the availability of PBOs, save 
for a statute making clear that paying a surrogate a fee does not violate 
the state’s criminal child-selling statutes.89 
A good sign that compensated surrogacy arrangements occur in an 
“in-the-shadows” jurisdiction is the presence of surrogacy agencies as 
well as doctors and lawyers specializing in surrogacy, and a quick 
internet search turned up several of each in Oregon. I spoke at length 
with the directors of three surrogacy agencies in Oregon, as well as a 
few attorneys and a couple of clinics specializing in surrogacy 
arrangements, all of whom assured me that despite the absence of 
published law on the issue of surrogacy, in practice—at least at the trial 
court level in Portland—judges routinely signed PBOs declaring 
intended parents the legal parents of children born to surrogates within 
the state. Moreover, relative to California, gestational surrogacy was a 
bargain in Oregon, costing about half as much even though the 
surrogates and egg donors earned about the same amount, with the 
biggest difference being the fees charged by the surrogacy agencies and 
the lawyers in the two states.90 
Yet pursuing surrogacy in a state without an established statutory 
scheme governing surrogacy was not without some risk, and thus the 
“market price” for the intermediaries perhaps reflects this risk. Unlike 
states such as California, which have statutes making clear that the 
intended parents—not the surrogate and her husband if she is married—
are the legal parents of the child, Oregon’s statutory scheme is more 
traditional. If a woman gives birth to a child, her name must appear on 
the child’s original birth certificate.91 Moreover, her husband is 
rebuttably presumed to be the child’s father,92 and a challenge to that 
89. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.537 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
90. See, e.g., Anticipated Expenses, FUTURE FAMILIES NW, LLC, 
http://www.futurefamiliesnw.com/anticipated-expenses.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Costs, 
GREATEST GIFT SURROGACY CENTER NW, http://ggscnw.com/intended-parents/costs/ (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2014). 
91. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.088(8) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
92. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.070(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
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presumption cannot be brought by anyone other than the woman or her 
husband so long as they are married and cohabiting.93 This presumption 
meant that if the surrogate and her husband decided to keep the child, the 
statutory scheme would seem to conclusively provide that they were the 
legal parents. 
However, the statutory scheme in Oregon—while not expressly 
making reference to surrogacy arrangements (as do the statutes in the 
fourth group of states)—did seem to have a mechanism for having a 
court declare someone other than the birth mother and her husband to be 
a child’s legal parents. With respect to the birth mother, even though 
state law provides that the birth mother’s name must appear on the 
original birth certificate, it further provides that if a court determines that 
a woman other than the birth mother is the genetic mother, the court can 
order the birth certificate amended to remove the birth mother’s name 
and have the original placed under seal.94 Moreover, although the birth 
mother’s husband is ordinarily listed as the legal father on the original 
birth certificate, if a court order declares someone else to be the father 
then that person’s name shall appear on the original birth certificate.95 
Of course, these sorts of concerns only come into play when things go 
wrong, and in the overwhelming majority of surrogacy arrangements, 
everything goes smoothly, even in states where surrogacy occurs in the 
shadows. Indeed, the absence of cases addressing the enforceability of 
surrogacy contracts that is one of the hallmarks of a “shadow” 
jurisdiction is a sign that surrogacy arrangements in those states have 
thus far gone smoothly, since it is typically only when disputes arise 
between surrogates and intended parents that either appellate court 
decisions are published or corrective legislation enacted.96 
Yet the fact that there is no formal law regulating surrogacy in states 
such as Oregon does not mean that the situation is akin to the “Wild 
Wild West” as some have written about the surrogacy process in such 
jurisdictions.97 The intermediaries in the surrogacy process—the 
surrogacy agencies, lawyers, and doctors—have filled that vacuum with 
93. See id. § 109.070(2). 
94. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.088(8). 
95. See id. § 432.088(9)(d). 
96. See generally infra Part II.C.1. On occasion, the surrogate and the intended parents are not in 
a dispute with one another, but instead are in a dispute with a state agency that refuses to amend the 
birth certificate to reflect the intent of the parties. See, e.g., J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1269 
(D. Utah 2002). 
97. See, e.g., Alexander N. Hecht, The Wild Wild West: Inadequate Regulation of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology, 1 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 227, 228 (2001). 
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their own unwritten law that in many ways incorporates many of the 
safeguards that can be found in states that have detailed statutory 
regimes governing surrogacy. Indeed, these intermediaries have a 
powerful incentive to self-regulate to ensure successful surrogacy 
journeys, since they stand to lose if a dispute results in negative 
appellate court precedent or statutory law. 
Thus, I learned that all of the agencies have similar criteria for would-
be surrogates that are designed to weed out those who might be 
unprepared to give up custody of the child they give birth to. These 
include requirements that the surrogate already have had at least one 
child that she is parenting and that she undergo a psychological 
examination and criminal background check.98 Many of the agencies are 
run by former surrogates who know from experience what it takes to be 
a surrogate, and thus have a good nose for quickly sifting would-be 
surrogates.99 
Moreover, even if an agency approves a surrogate and she is matched 
with intended parents, the reproductive medicine clinics have their own 
criteria that are often more stringent than those of the surrogacy 
agencies. For example, although some agencies will still work with 
traditional surrogates, most reproductive medicine clinics will not.100 
Since traditional surrogacy cases—in which the surrogate has a genetic 
link to the resulting child—are far more likely to result in custody 
disputes,101 this extra level of screening likewise has the effect of 
minimizing possible custody disputes. In addition, our reproductive 
medicine clinic required that the parties submit a copy of their signed 
surrogacy contract, which necessarily added a third level of screening—
that of the attorneys. The back-and-forth of the attorneys in negotiating 
the terms of the contract ensured that important topics likely to result in 
possible disputes were fully considered and resolved. 
To be sure, these safeguards are by no means foolproof. Intended 
parents and surrogates could circumvent the agency screening by finding 
98. See, e.g., Becoming a Surrogate, NW SURROGACY CENTER, LLC, 
http://www.nwsurrogacycenter.com/becoming_a_surrogate_mother.html (last visited July 22, 
2014); Surrogates, FUTURE FAMILIES NW, LLC, http://www.futurefamiliesnw.com/surrogates.html 
(last visited July 22, 2014); Surrogates, GREATEST GIFT SURROGACY CENTER NW, 
http://ggscnw.com/surrogates/ (last visited July 22, 2014). 
99. See, e.g., About Us, FUTURE FAMILIES NW, LLC, http://www.futurefamiliesnw.com/about-
us.html (last visited July 22, 2014); About Us, GREATEST GIFT SURROGACY CENTER NW, 
http://ggscnw.com/about-us/ (last visited July 22, 2014). 
100. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, OR. REPROD. MED., 
http://www.oregonreproductivemedicine.com/main-faq (last visited July 22, 2014). 
101. See Lewin, supra note 20, at 14. 
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one another through websites, much like internet-based dating.102 
Moreover, if they decided to pursue traditional surrogacy, they would 
not even need the assistance of a doctor103 and could even forego 
entering into a contract, thus circumventing the clinic and attorney 
screening. But this does not necessarily make the state of affairs in 
Oregon inferior to that in states with detailed statutory regimes in place. 
After all, those statutory regimes typically allow someone who cannot or 
does not wish to meet the criteria to “opt out,” the consequence being 
simply that they cannot rely on the automatic enforceability and 
parentage provisions. In a state such as Oregon, opting out potentially 
means being denied the assistance of the small handful of intermediaries 
whose assistance is often crucial for a successful surrogacy journey. 
D. A Closer Look at the Matching Process: The Search for a 
Surrogate and an Egg Donor 
After doing our due diligence, we settled on Oregon and began the 
process of being matched with a surrogate. We selected a small agency 
in Oregon run by two women who had been surrogate mothers and egg 
donors on several occasions. As two men about to engage in a process 
that some view as exploitative of women in general or lower income 
women in particular, we were drawn to the fact that these women had 
themselves served as surrogates and seemed to be interested in making 
sure that both the surrogates and the intended parents were treated fairly. 
They accomplished this by keeping their own overhead and in turn their 
fees low—they worked out of their own homes and not in a fancy office 
building—while compensating the surrogates at rates comparable to 
those at other agencies both within and outside the state. 
The process of matching intended parents and surrogates is an 
idiosyncratic one designed to ensure compatibility. The agency needed 
enough information about us as a couple that the prospective surrogates 
could decide whether they felt comfortable carrying a child for us. For 
surrogates—at least those that pass the psychological screening 
process—this is about more than just compensation; it is about helping a 
couple that they truly feel comfortable helping to become parents. 
Surrogates can thus screen out intended parents for any reason, including 
based on such characteristics as the age, religion, or sexual orientation of 
102. See, e.g., Surrogate Mothers Online: Virtual Classifieds, SURROGATE MOTHERS ONLINE, 
http://www.surromomsonline.com/classifieds/index.htm (last visited June 19, 2014). 
103. See Anthony Miller, Baseline, Bright-Line, Best Interests: A Pragmatic Approach for 
California to Provide Certainty in Determining Parentage, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 637, 671 (2003). 
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the intended parents, their plans for childcare (daycare versus nanny 
versus stay-at-home parent) or even their favorite color or television 
show. 
Beyond filling out this dating-style profile, we had to decide whether 
we were seeking to match with a traditional or a gestational surrogate, as 
well as whether we wanted to be matched with an experienced or a first-
time surrogate. The biggest advantages of selecting a traditional 
surrogate and a first-time surrogate are cost. Traditional surrogacy costs 
approximately $30,000 less because it avoids both the expenses of 
compensating a third-party donor for her eggs and the medical fees 
associated with in vitro fertilization, while first-time surrogates are 
compensated approximately $5,000 to $10,000 less than experienced 
ones. Yet like many intended parents pursuing surrogacy, our biggest 
fear was that the surrogate would decide for some reason to retain 
custody of the child, and thus the extra expenses associated with 
selecting gestational surrogacy and an experienced surrogate were an 
insurance policy against this risk that was worth the premium. 
With an experienced surrogate, you know that she has been through 
and thus can handle the complex legal, medical, and emotional aspects 
of surrogacy, including allowing the intended parents to take custody of 
the child to whom she gives birth. And with gestational surrogacy, the 
surrogate lacks the genetic link that—when coupled with gestation—
makes traditional surrogacy a riskier proposition, since the woman is 
giving away what in a very real sense is her child. Accordingly, even 
jurisdictions that are otherwise “surrogacy friendly” differentiate 
between gestational and traditional surrogacy, treating the latter as more 
akin to a woman giving a child up for adoption who can change her 
mind up to and shortly after birth and thus not determining parentage 
pre-birth.104 Due to the psychological and legal complexities associated 
with the merger of genetics and gestation, ever since medical science has 
been able to separate gestational from genetic motherhood, gestational 
surrogacy has become the preferred method for surrogates and intended 
parents alike.105 
104. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 898–901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
105. See, e.g., Gaia Bernstein, Unintended Consequences: Prohibitions on Gamete Donor 
Anonymity and the Fragile Practice of Surrogacy, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 291, 296–97 (2013); 
Kim Willoughby, ART: Enter the Lawyer, 32 FAM. ADVOC., Spring 2010, at 36, 37–38; Using a 
Surrogate Mother: What You Need to Know, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/infertility-and-
reproduction/guide/using-surrogate-mother (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). In this regard, the biblical 
story of Sarah, Abraham, and Hagar was a cautionary tale so far as traditional surrogacy is 
concerned. While Hagar became pregnant and gave birth, she did not really want to give up the 
child and Sarah became jealous of Hagar, and after Sarah was miraculously cured of her infertility 
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Next, we had to answer a series of four questions that the agency said 
were critical to making a good match. First, what type of relationship did 
we want with the surrogate during the process: did we want to attend 
every appointment, be present for the birth and be in regular contact, or 
did we want a more arm’s length relationship? Second, what type of 
relationship did we want with the surrogate after the child was born: did 
we want her to be like an extended member of the family, have no 
contact post-birth, or something in between? Third, how many embryos 
did we want to transfer at a time? Fourth, what are our views on abortion 
due to the discovery of a birth defect during the pregnancy? Or an 
abortion through the process of “selective reduction” whereby multiple 
embryos are transferred and if more than are desired successfully 
implant, the excess ones are aborted. The only “right” answers to these 
questions, they stressed, were honest answers, since discovery of a 
difference of opinion on any of these can lead to tensions and conflict. 
Of all these questions, the abortion question is perhaps the most 
challenging one to grapple with. It is the one most likely to result in a 
serious conflict between a surrogate and intended parents.106 People have 
a hard time sorting out their own views on abortion, and indeed many 
couples do not completely see eye-to-eye on the issue. Yet we not only 
had to come to terms with this issue individually and as a couple, but we 
also had to find a surrogate with similar views on the issue. Moreover, 
this all had to be done in the abstract, not knowing how we would feel in 
the moment should we be confronted with such a decision. 
With our surrogate search underway, we now had to turn our attention 
to the other half of the equation: finding an egg donor. We had already 
selected a reproductive medicine clinic in Oregon, and although we were 
free to find an egg donor on our own or through an independent agency, 
they had their own in-house egg donor program. In addition to searching 
for a specific egg donor, we had several other difficult decisions to 
make, some of which overlapped with the questions asked by the 
surrogacy agency. Did we want to transfer one or multiple embryos, and 
would we choose to selectively reduce if more than the desired number 
implanted? Would only one of us be contributing the sperm used to 
create the embryos, or did they want us to fertilize half of the eggs with 
sperm from each of us and implant one embryo fertilized by each of us 
in the surrogate (or select a single embryo at random)? Did we want to 
and bore a child herself, she banished Hagar and the son she bore. See Genesis 16:4–16, 21:1–14. 
106. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cohen, Surrogate Offered $10,000 to Abort Baby, CNN HEALTH (Mar. 
6, 2013, 2:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/04/health/surrogacy-kelley-legal-battle/. 
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pick an egg donor and go through the process right away, freeze the 
embryos, and then thaw them once we found a surrogate? Or did we 
want to wait until we found a surrogate and then do a “fresh” cycle in 
which the menstrual cycles of the two women are coordinated, the eggs 
extracted and fertilized from the donor and then implanted into the 
surrogate? Did we want the embryos tested for genetic abnormalities 
(which also happened to test for the sex of the embryos)? 
Having answered this new set of inquiries, we were ready to begin the 
search for an egg donor within the clinic’s in-house program. While egg 
donation can occur with a known donor, it is far more common for it to 
occur anonymously, with the intended parents having photographs of the 
donor, her medical and personal history as well as that of her family, and 
her answers to a series of questions designed to give the intended parents 
insight into her personality. 
On the one hand, the search for an egg donor is far easier than the 
search for a surrogate: the clinic had an electronic searchable database in 
which you could enter desired criteria—such as eye color, hair color, 
ethnicity, whether they had successfully donated eggs in the past, and 
even sexual orientation—and it would bring up results, akin to a dating 
website. But unlike with dating websites or the surrogate matching 
process, this is a one-way match: egg donors do not know anything 
about the individuals or couples that will receive the eggs, and at least at 
our clinic, could not limit the categories or types of individuals or 
couples that their eggs could go to. Thus, as long as we were happy with 
a given egg donor’s profile, we could just pick her and she would be 
matched with us. 
Yet on the other hand, the search for an egg donor is so much harder 
than the search for a surrogate because this person will be contributing 
half of the genetic makeup of your future child. Although those who 
have not gone through the process might assume that intended parents 
are focused primarily on the egg donor’s looks and intellect, for us the 
egg donor’s personal and family medical history took center stage.107 
Indeed, the amount of medical history we were given resulted in near 
decision-making paralysis. How could we live with ourselves if we 
picked an egg donor with a bee allergy, a grandfather who died of heart 
disease, a grandmother who died of breast cancer, or a father who had 
107. A recent study indicates that recipients of egg donation are increasingly interested in a 
donor’s health, intelligence, and athletic ability, and decreasingly interested in whether or not the 
donor resembles the recipient or is from the same gene pool. See Homero Flores et. al., Beauty, 
Brains, or Health: Trends in Ovum Recipient Preferences, 23 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 830, 832–33 
(2014). 
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diabetes and our future child was diagnosed with one of those ailments 
at some point down the road? 
Those who have not gone through the process of egg donation may 
also be under the impression that there is a great deal of price 
discrimination based on the looks, intelligence, or ethnicity of the egg 
donor. There are certainly plenty of news stories that sensationalize this 
belief as well as the occasional private advertisement by intended 
parents offering large sums of money to Ivy League egg donors.108 Yet 
the truth is that at reputable agencies, there is no price discrimination 
except for a modest premium for those who have successfully donated 
eggs once before. 
Although the absence of price discrimination is in part grounded in 
law, it is primarily a result of self-regulation by the fertility industry. No 
federal law regulates compensation to those who donate eggs for fertility 
purposes, and only a handful of state laws in any way regulate egg donor 
compensation under these circumstances.109 Specifically, Louisiana law 
prohibits any compensation to any egg donors,110 Indiana law makes it a 
crime to compensate an egg donor more than $4,000 plus expenses,111 
and Florida law provides that “[o]nly reasonable compensation” is 
permitted.112 Nevada law, while not setting any specific limit on the 
amount of compensation, provides that the amount cannot be tied to the 
“purported quality or genome-related traits of the gametes of 
embryos.”113 The more significant restriction on the amount of 
compensation given to egg donors are the ethical guidelines of the 
American Society of Reproductive Medicine, which are binding on all 
108. See, e.g., Melinda Henneberger, The Ultimate Easter Egg Hunt: ‘Ivy League Couple’ Seeks 
Donor with ‘Highest Scores’, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
she-the-people/wp/2013/03/21/the-ultimate-easter-egg-hunt-ivy-league-couple-seeks-donor-with-
highest-percentile-scores/; Gina Kolata, $50,000 Offered to Tall, Smart Egg Donor, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 3, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/03/us/50000-offered-to-tall-smart-egg-
donor.html; Kevin Su, Not by the Dozen, YALE HERALD (Feb. 21, 2014), http://yaleherald.com/ 
news-and-features/not-by-the-dozen/. 
109. Some states prohibit compensation when eggs are to be used for medical research, but not 
when donated for fertility purposes. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125350 (West, 
Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. ch. 531); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111L, § 8(b) (West, 
Westlaw through 2014 2d Annual Sess. ch. 283). Arizona law does not prohibit compensation for 
egg donors but requires health warnings to be given to them. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-
1701 to 36-1703 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. & 2d Special Sess.). 
110. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
111. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-5-3 (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. & 2d Technical 
Sess. 2014). 
112. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.). 
113. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.810(2) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. & Special Sess.). 
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member clinics of its affiliated organization, the Society for Assisted 
Reproductive Technology. Under those guidelines, compensation in 
excess of $5,000 requires “justification” and compensation in excess of 
$10,000 is “not appropriate.”114 Indeed, so influential are those 
guidelines that they are currently the subject of a class action lawsuit 
brought on behalf of egg donors claiming that they violate federal 
antitrust laws.115 
As intended parents seeking out a surrogate and egg donor, not only 
do you have to make decisions that can dictate your child’s future, but 
you often have to do so under time pressure. On multiple occasions, we 
would receive a profile from our surrogacy agency or a new egg donor 
profile would pop up in the clinic’s database, and before we had a 
chance to make a decision—often as quickly as 24 hours later—the 
surrogate or egg donor would no longer be available because another set 
of intended parents had been more decisive. 
A couple of months into our search, we were matched with a 
surrogate located in Portland, Oregon. Our surrogate was unmarried and 
had previously served as a traditional surrogate, which made her the 
ideal surrogate from the standpoint of intended parents who harbored the 
typical fear that a surrogate and her husband might have a change of 
heart and decide to keep the child. As an unmarried woman there was no 
husband entitled to the presumption of paternity, meaning that even if 
she for some reason were to try to retain custody, at least the genetic 
father between us would be able to establish legal paternity. Moreover, if 
she was able to give up custody in a situation in which she was both the 
genetic and gestational mother, doing so when she was solely the 
gestational mother would seem to be a foregone conclusion. The 
matching process consisted of us liking one another’s profiles, followed 
by a telephone conference, and finally an in-person meeting with her and 
her son. As with dating, we later learned that the reason she chose to 
match with us was idiosyncratic: a picture of my partner and me at 
Disney World holding hands with the Disney characters “Chip” and 
“Dale” that was included in our profile had sold her on us. 
Soon after matching, our surrogate was hospitalized with what turned 
out to be a serious thyroid condition. The condition required radioactive 
iodine treatment that would make pregnancy unsafe for the resulting 
114. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Ethics Committee Report: Financial Compensation of Oocyte 
Donors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 308 (2007).  
115. See Kamakahi v. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., No. C 11-01781 SBA, 2013 WL 1768706 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2013). If my biological clock ticking was not enough of a motivator to move 
ahead quickly with the process, the prospect of a successful antitrust lawsuit certainly was! 
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child for six to eight months following the treatment. In her message to 
us, she wrote that if we preferred not to wait and instead match with 
another surrogate, she would understand, and ended that sentence with a 
sad-face emoticon. Our agency gave us the option of matching with 
someone else but we felt so comfortable with her that we decided we 
would rather delay the process than start the matching process over from 
scratch. And just as with the idiosyncratic nature of the “Chip ‘n’ Dale” 
photograph, there was something about that sad-face emoticon that made 
our decision clear. 
Our surrogate’s recovery period gave us ample time to match with a 
suitable egg donor. Like our surrogate, our egg donor was also an 
unmarried woman from Portland, Oregon. We initially preferred to have 
an experienced egg donor since we would know something about her 
fertility, but could not find an experienced egg donor whose profile 
clicked with us, and so we ultimately selected a first-time egg donor 
whose medical history and other traits made her the ideal match for us. 
E. Straddling the Columbia 
With our surrogate and egg donor selected, it was time to get the 
lawyers involved in the process. In addition to hiring a lawyer to 
represent us, we had to pay the legal fees of the attorneys independently 
selected by both the egg donor and the surrogate to represent them. 
The contract with the egg donor was fairly straightforward, and 
indeed was a form contract that the clinic had drafted by an attorney for 
use in its in-house egg donor program. There were three key aspects of 
the contract. First, that the donor acquired neither parental rights nor 
responsibilities over any children born as a result of the donation. 
Second, that if the donor subsequently experienced any significant major 
changes in family medical history she would convey that information to 
us via the clinic so that our child would have a complete medical history. 
And third, that if the child resulting from the egg donation suffered from 
any medical or psychological conditions that might be genetically linked 
to the egg donor, we would convey that information to the donor via the 
clinic so that she could make informed decisions regarding having 
children of her own in the future. 
In contrast, the surrogacy contract was somewhat more complex. As 
an initial matter, fully circumventing both Washington’s criminal and 
civil law regarding surrogacy would require care and planning. 
Washington State does not, as a general matter, purport to apply its 
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criminal law to the conduct of its citizens that takes place wholly outside 
of the state,116 and even if it did, it is doubtful that doing so would be 
consistent with the limits of due process.117 This meant, however, that to 
avoid liability, we could not “enter into”118 the contract within the 
territorial boundaries of the state, meaning that unlike the egg donor 
contract—which we reviewed and signed in Washington State—we 
would have to travel to Oregon to sign the contract. Indeed, throughout 
the entire surrogacy process, I felt a weight come off my shoulders each 
time I crossed the Columbia River that serves as the border between 
Washington State and Oregon. 
Circumventing Washington’s civil law on surrogacy would take 
somewhat more planning. While we could easily avoid criminal liability 
by taking care to ensure that the contract was not entered into within the 
state, the civil aspect of Washington’s surrogacy law addressed not 
formation but subsequent enforcement of surrogacy contracts, declaring 
such contracts to be “void and unenforceable in the state of 
Washington.”119 Moreover, even if the contract was entered into out-of-
state, the civil provision made clear that it applied to all such contracts, 
“whether executed in the state of Washington or in another 
jurisdiction.”120 This meant that if a surrogate gave birth in Washington 
State, the contract would not be enforceable. In addition, on our 
attorney’s advice—which was consistent with my thinking as someone 
who has taught Conflict of Laws—we did not consider matching with 
surrogates who resided in Washington State, even if they were willing to 
relocate to Oregon in the final weeks of pregnancy. This is because our 
joint status as citizens of Washington State might be problematic even if 
enforcement were sought in Oregon, since in a conflict-of-laws analysis 
a court in Oregon might apply Washington law and declare the contract 
invalid even if it would be valid under the state’s own laws and even if 
we had a choice of law clause in our contract.121 
116. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.04.030 (2012). 
117. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822–25 (1975). But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe 
Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611, 
626–40 (2007) (contending that the due process limitation is not entirely clear cut, and considering 
other constitutional limitations on extraterritorial application of a state’s criminal law). 
118. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.230 (2012). We, and anyone else involved, also could not 
“induce, arrange, procure, or otherwise assist in the formation of” such a contract within the state. 
Id. 
119. Id. § 26.26.240. 
120. Id. 
121. See, e.g., Hodas v. Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320, 324–27 (Mass. 2004) (engaging in a conflict-of-
laws analysis to decide whether to give effect to parties’ choice-of-law provision in surrogacy 
 
                                                     
 
13 - Nicolas_Final for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/16/20146:32 PM 
2014] STRADDLING THE COLUMBIA 1257 
On the other hand, upon completion of the surrogacy process in 
Oregon, it was clear that Washington would recognize the newly created 
parent-child relationship. If our parentage was established by means of a 
judicial proceeding in Oregon, Washington would be obliged under the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize the judgment.122 Moreover, as 
one of us would be the genetic parent of the child, that parent could sign 
an acknowledgment of paternity in Oregon, and Washington law would 
give that acknowledgement full legal effect.123 Finally, even if the out-
of-court judicial proceedings only established the non-parentage of the 
surrogate and the parentage of the genetic father, because we were 
registered domestic partners, by operation of Washington law the other 
partner would likewise be deemed a legal parent under one of several 
statutory provisions enacted by the legislature in 2011,124 the same year 
in which it tried but failed to repeal the criminal prohibition on 
surrogacy.125 First, the legislature expanded the ancient presumption of 
paternity—whereby a husband is presumed to be the father of any 
children born to his wife—to same-sex relationships.126 Second, the 
legislature further provided that a person is presumed to be the parent of 
a child if, for the first two years of the child’s life, he resides in the same 
house as the child and holds him out as his own.127 Third, the legislature 
provided that a person who consents to assisted reproduction by his 
domestic partner that results in the birth of a child is the legal parent of 
the child.128 These three129 provisions meant that it is not necessary in 
Washington State for the non-biological partner to adopt the child to 
establish legal parentage, although to ensure recognition in less gay-
contract); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 187(2)(b), 188(2) (1971). 
122. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Baker by Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232–
33 (1998); Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1151–56 (10th Cir. 2007); Henry v. Himes, No. 
1:14-CV-129, 2014 WL 1418395, at *17, *18 n.24 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2014), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, Nos.14-1341, 3057, 3464, 5291, 5297, 5818, 2014 WL 
5748990 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2014); Embry v. Ryan, 11 So. 3d 408, 409–10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
123. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.350. 
124. See Act of May 11, 2011, ch. 283, 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws 1758 (codified at WASH. REV. 
CODE ch. 26.26). 
125. See Terry J. Price, The Future of Compensated Surrogacy in Washington State: Anytime 
Soon?, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1311, 1326−36 (2014). 
126. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.101(5), 26.26.116(1)(a). 
127. See id. §§ 26.26.101(5), 26.26.116(2). 
128. See id. §§ 26.26.101(7), 26.26.710, 26.26.715, 26.26.720. 
129. A fourth provision indicates that a person who is an intended parent in a “valid surrogate 
parentage” contract is also a legal parent, but that provision—which cross-references the statutory 
provisions governing surrogacy for a definition of validity—was not available to us. See id. 
§ 26.26.101(8). 
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friendly states some sort of judicial decree that would be entitled to Full 
Faith and Credit would be needed, such as an order adjudicating 
parentage based on one of the above statutory provisions.130 
Our surrogacy agreement was thus carefully drafted to address the 
above concerns, as well as many others designed to protect the well-
being of the child that would be born as a result of the agreement. Thus, 
under the terms of the contract, our surrogate agreed that she would not 
have any parental rights or responsibilities with respect to the child, and 
that she would cooperate in obtaining a PBO establishing our legal 
parentage. She also agreed to the following list of restrictions, among 
others: (1) not to travel outside of Oregon in her last trimester of 
pregnancy; (2) not to smoke, drink alcohol, or use illegal drugs; and (3) 
not to consume raw fish, food or drink containing artificial sweeteners, 
or more than one cup of caffeinated beverage per day. She also agreed—
within the confines of what she considered to be acceptable reasons for 
procuring an abortion—to undergo an abortion at our request if one of 
those situations she deemed acceptable arose, and also agreed not to 
undergo an abortion against our wishes unless necessary to protect her 
health. In other words—and within limits set by her—she delegated her 
fundamental right to abort or not abort to us. While this last provision 
may seem shocking to some, in a sense it is consistent with why the U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized the abortion decision to be a fundamental 
right in the first instance: that restricting the right to an abortion may 
thrust unwanted maternity and its attendant harms to the pregnant 
woman.131 Since the remainder of the contract made clear that we, not 
the surrogate, would take on parental responsibilities of any child born to 
her as a result of the arrangement, there was a certain degree of logic in 
her likewise transferring her abortion right to us. Moreover, she was still 
exercising her fundamental right, in the sense that she was agreeing to 
have or not have an abortion on terms acceptable to her. The contract did 
not contemplate specific performance, and at least some states explicitly 
declare such provisions in surrogacy contracts unenforceable,132 but in 
130. See id. § 26.26.625. In a similar vein, courts in New York have held that where one partner 
in a same-sex couple is the genetic father of a child born to a surrogate in India, the fact that the 
underlying surrogacy arrangement would be a crime in New York was no bar to allowing the other 
partner to adopt the child. See In re Adoption of J.J., 984 N.Y.S.2d 841 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2014). 
131. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
132. A handful of states have provisions that restrict abortion-related provisions in surrogacy 
contracts. Specifically, Texas and Utah law provide that surrogacy agreements cannot limit the 
surrogate’s right to make decisions to safeguard the health of the embryo or fetus. See TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 160.754(g) (West, Westlaw through 3d Called Sess. 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-
15-808(2) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Gen. Sess.). 
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my mind surrogacy contracts are less about enforceability and more a 
vehicle for having conversations about difficult topics and making sure 
that everyone is on the same page. In fact, since our surrogacy agency 
had already pre-screened us all on the abortion issue, this provision 
generated no back-and-forth during the contract negotiation process. 
Rather, we spent most of our time discussing a provision regarding our 
surrogate’s handling of cat litter! 
Of course, the surrogacy contract also imposed obligations upon us. 
We agreed to take custody of any child our surrogate bore pursuant to 
the agreement. While this may not seem like much of an obligation on 
intended parents, it is protective of the surrogate. On occasion, a child 
will be born with a serious medical condition or the intended parents will 
break up and may not wish to take custody of the child.133 The 
surrogate’s interest in not becoming an unintended parent is thus one 
that needs protection. In addition, we agreed to pay all of her medical 
expenses associated with the surrogacy process, her health insurance 
premiums,134 her maternity clothing expenses, housekeeping and 
childcare expenses, a fee for undergoing an embryo transfer, and her 
compensation for serving as a surrogate. While it is often assumed that 
this last item is paid to the surrogate only upon relinquishment of the 
child to the intended parents, that is not the case: the surrogate is paid 
that fee for the physical process of gestating and the attendant pain and 
suffering, and thus receives that fee in ten monthly installments during 
the term of the pregnancy. Accordingly, she is entitled to the 
compensation even if, say, she miscarries late in the pregnancy. 
Other provisions in the surrogacy contract are designed to address 
various eventualities should they arise. We agreed to name guardians for 
our children in our wills in the event that we died before the surrogate 
gave birth. We agreed to purchase a life insurance policy for our 
surrogate to protect her child’s financial well-being in the event that she 
died for any reason while pregnant. We also agreed to pay additional 
compensation for each additional fetus that she carried, as well as 
compensation in the event that she had to undergo a C-Section or 
suffered partial or full loss of her reproductive function. These last two 
133. See Lewin, supra note 20, at A1; Hollie McKay, Can Sherri Shepherd Walk Away from 
Unborn Surrogate Child?, FOX NEWS (July 22, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/ 
2014/07/22/can-sherri-shepherd-walk-away-from-unborn-surrogate-child/. 
134. State laws vary widely on whether a surrogate’s health insurance will cover the medical 
expenses associated with a surrogate birth, with some courts upholding decisions by insurers not to 
cover such expenses, see, e.g., Spectrum Health Hosp. v. Lehr, No. 298688, 2011 WL 3962997 
(Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2011), and others holding that insurers cannot exclude maternity coverage 
for surrogates, see, e.g., MercyCare Ins. Co. v. Wis. Comm’r of Ins., 786 N.W.2d 785 (Wis. 2010). 
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items, to my mind, have a shockingly low “market” value, with the 
going rate of compensation in the United States being only $3,000 for 
the former and $5,000 for the latter.135 
In cases involving challenges to state laws prohibiting same-sex 
marriage, one of the “rational bases” offered in support of limiting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples is that since same-sex couples have to 
go through so much care and planning to have children, they are not as 
much in need of the protections of marriage as are opposite-sex couples, 
whose natural procreation is often unplanned and thus the resulting 
children need the protections that come automatically with marriage.136 
Having gone through so much care and planning to become a parent via 
surrogacy, and despite my strong belief that prohibitions on same-sex 
marriage are unconstitutional, I was starting to become reluctantly 
convinced that—at least under rational basis review—this was not such a 
bad defense of such laws! 
Our surrogacy contract was drafted, negotiated, and signed within 
Oregon, and set forth criteria designed to prevent ever having to enforce 
the contract within Washington State. We had thus successfully 
circumvented Washington State’s criminal prohibition on compensated 
surrogacy agreements, while at the same time laying the groundwork for 
having our parent-child relationship recognized by Washington State. 
F. Becoming Pregnant and Giving Birth 
With the legal formalities complete, it was time to get started with the 
process of creating human life. In general, the surrogacy process is 
unregulated by the federal government. However, because the process of 
in vitro fertilization involves the transfer of human tissue—specifically a 
sperm and egg—from one pair of people to another person, reproductive 
medicine clinics are required to follow federal regulations issued by the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration.137 
Pursuant to those regulations, before transferring a fertilized embryo 
to the surrogate, the donors of the sperm and egg must be tested for a 
135. See, e.g., Anticipated Expenses, supra note 90; Surrogacy Procedure, COASTAL 
SURROGACY, http://www.coastalsurrogacy.com/sg_par_costs.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); 
Surrogate Benefit Package—Gestational Surrogacy, GROWING GENERATIONS, 
http://www.growinggenerations.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Sample-BP-for-GG_ 
Website_20130815.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
136. See Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1111–13 (D. Haw. 2012); Hernandez v. 
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 23–24 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2005). 
137. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.1–1271.90 (2014). 
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variety of communicable diseases, including HIV, at or within seven 
days of when the sperm and egg are retrieved from the donors.138 In 
addition, the donors of the sperm and egg are required to answer a series 
of questions designed to identify whether their “social behavior” 
includes “risk factors” for communicable diseases.139 The regulations 
themselves do not specify what constitute “risk factors,” but technically 
non-binding “guidance”140 issued by the FDA includes among the list of 
risk factors that the sperm donor has had sex with another man in the 
preceding 5 years.141 
Despite the fact that my partner and I tested negative for HIV and 
numerous other communicable diseases multiple times both before and 
after the clinic collected and froze sperm for use in the in vitro 
fertilization process, because of the positive question regarding sex with 
another man in the preceding five years, the FDA requires the sperm 
sample to be labeled with a “[b]iohazard” warning label142 and the 
phrase “WARNING: Advise recipient of communicable disease 
risks.”143 Moreover, the sperm donor is deemed ineligible,144 meaning 
that his sperm cannot be implanted into another person.145 In contrast to 
this five year period of ineligibility for sexually active gay men, the 
FDA guidelines impose only a twelve-month period of ineligibility for 
those other than gay men who have had sexual intercourse with someone 
who is HIV positive or have otherwise been exposed to an HIV infection 
risk, or who have undergone tattooing or body piercing using non-sterile 
equipment.146 
A small loophole in the FDA regulations nonetheless permits but 
strongly discourages people in the position of our surrogate from moving 
ahead with the process even if a clinic has determined someone to be an 
ineligible donor under the regulations. Pursuant to those regulations, if 
the sperm donor is a “directed reproductive donor”—meaning that the 
138. See id. § 1271.80(a), (b); id. § 1271.85(a), (c). 
139. See id. § 1271.75(a)(1); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ELIGIBILITY 
DETERMINATION FOR DONORS OF HUMAN CELLS, TISSUES, AND CELLULAR AND TISSUE-BASED 
PRODUCTS 14 (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/ 
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/Tissue/ucm091345.pdf [hereinafter ELIGIBILITY 
DETERMINATION FOR DONORS]. 
140. ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION FOR DONORS, supra note 139, at 1. 
141. Id. at 14.  
142. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.90(b)(4)(ii). 
143. See id. § 1271.90(b)(3)(ii)(B). 
144. See id. § 1271.50. 
145. See id. § 1271.45(c). 
146. See ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION FOR DONORS, supra note 139, at 15–16. 
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sperm donor and the recipient knew one another prior to the donation 
taking place147—the transfer can proceed.148 To invoke this loophole, we 
and our surrogate were required to sign two documents provided to us by 
the clinic. The first was entitled “Statement of Relationship,” in which 
we confirmed that we had met at least once in person, thus establishing 
that we were “known” to one another. And the second was entitled 
“Communicable Disease Testing/Risk Factor Waiver,” in which the 
surrogate acknowledged that she was at an increased risk of becoming 
infected with HIV or various other communicable diseases because the 
sperm was from a man who has had sex with another man. We were 
fortunate our clinic was willing to do this, as some clinics use the FDA’s 
guidance as a basis for refusing to provide reproductive services to any 
gay men.149 
After a long wait and plenty of paperwork, our surrogate and egg 
donor were medically cleared to proceed with the process. Because we 
were proceeding with a “fresh” transfer, the two women began taking 
medications designed to synchronize their menstrual cycles, since the 
surrogate would need to be at the right point in her cycle for the embryo 
to implant following the extraction and fertilization of eggs from the egg 
donor. In addition, the egg donor began taking medications that would 
help stimulate the maturation and release of multiple eggs. Over the 
course of approximately a one-month period, both our surrogate and egg 
donor would make regular visits to the clinic. During that month, I often 
wondered if the paths of these two women from Portland—who did not 
know one another—ever crossed. 
The days leading up to the day when the eggs would be extracted 
from our donor were nerve-wracking. Since she was a first-time donor 
who did not have children of her own, she lacked a fertility track record, 
and there was thus no guarantee that she would produce quality eggs. 
Yet the egg donor and the fertility clinic are compensated for their 
efforts, not the results, and with this step in the process costing around 
$30,000 for the donor and clinic fees combined, it was one that we and 
most intended parents could ill afford to repeat a second or third time. 
On retrieval day, we received a call notifying us that they had 
147. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(l). 
148. See id. § 1271.65(b)(ii). 
149. See Leland Traiman, Guidelines But No Guidance: Gayspermbank.com vs. FDA, 9 J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST. 613, 614–15 (2006); Beth Littrell, Fertility Industry Bias Against Gays and 
Lesbians, Opinion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2011, 11:31 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
roomfordebate/2011/09/13/making-laws-about-making-babies/fertility-industry-victimizes-gays-
and-lesbians. 
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retrieved nearly thirty eggs! That did not mean, however, that we would 
have that many embryos, as some eggs are too immature to be fertilized, 
some, though mature, fail to fertilize, and those that successfully are 
fertilized stop growing before they can be implanted or frozen. We 
ultimately ended up with five embryos. The doctor—after following 
careful protocol to ensure that the embryos in fact belonged to us and not 
some other couple150—implanted one of those in our surrogate, and 
subsequently froze four others for possible future use.151 
Soon thereafter, a positive pregnancy was confirmed, first by our 
surrogate using a home pregnancy test and then several weeks later by 
the doctor by performing an ultrasound. From that point forward, the 
pregnancy was for the most part no different than any other pregnancy, 
save for a couple of key differences for which there were creative 
workarounds. 
First, despite the relatively long drive, we were able to make sure at 
least one of us was able to attend all of the ultrasounds. One of the 
challenges when attending an ultrasound with a surrogate—as opposed 
to one’s wife—is that the process requires the woman to be in a certain 
state of undress, which is awkward in what otherwise has developed as 
an arm’s length relationship. Yet medical providers in Portland seemed 
familiar enough with the surrogacy process to have a solution, a 
“modesty” shield that allowed the intended parents to see the ultrasound 
monitor while shielding the surrogate’s body from view. 
Second, one of the miracles of nature is that when a baby is born, she 
150. It is quite rare to have an embryo transfer error, but it does happen. See, e.g., Perry-Rogers v. 
Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19, 25 & n.2 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (holding that custody of a child born as a 
result of such an error belongs to the intended parents rather than the gestating woman and her 
husband, but noting that things might have been different had a great deal of time passed before the 
error was discovered). 
151. When couples that have created embryos together via in vitro fertilization divorce, disputes 
sometimes arise regarding the disposition of those embryos. Some courts have held that these cases 
involve a balancing of competing fundamental rights: the fundamental right of one spouse to 
procreate versus the fundamental right of the other not to procreate, with the courts often ruling in 
favor of the spouse seeking not to procreate, particularly if the other spouse still has a viable way to 
otherwise procreate. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 780 (Iowa 2003); J.B. v. M.B., 
783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992). Other courts have 
held that the fundamental right not to procreate is sufficiently strong that prior written agreements 
regarding the disposition of embryos are unenforceable. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 
2000). However, some courts say that such agreements should generally be binding. See Kass v. 
Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006); Litowitz v. 
Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002); Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) 
(noting that even fundamental rights can be waived by contract). Because of this risk, the clinic we 
used requires all couples to sign documents declaring our intent for disposition of the embryos in 
the event of a subsequent divorce. 
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is able to recognize the voice of her gestational mother as well as anyone 
else who lived with her. We learned that in cases of surrogacy or the 
adoption of newborns, the inability to recognize any familiar voices 
sometimes resulted in some degree of psychological anxiety for newborn 
children.152 Our solution was for my partner and me to each record our 
voices reading bedtime stories to our future child and upload them to an 
MP3 player. We sent that, along with a pair of “belly buds”—speakers 
that a woman can attach directly to her stomach—to our surrogate, who 
played them to our child regularly during the last trimester, when 
children in utero can both hear and remember voices around them. 
Third, partway through the third trimester, our attorney filed a 
declaratory judgment action in a state court in Portland, seeking to have 
parentage established pre-birth. Our surrogate, through her attorney and 
consistent with our contractual agreement, consented to the issuance of 
the order, and with our future child still in utero, a judge issued an order 
declaring our intended parentage and directing the state Department of 
Health to issue a birth certificate post-birth that reflected that state of 
affairs. 
Finally, in the last month of pregnancy, our surrogate started to have 
contractions. Of course, each time this happened it was not a quick drive 
down the street but instead a nearly 200-mile drive to Portland. The first 
time was a false alarm, then after a hiatus from contractions of about a 
week, we received a call from our surrogate just after eleven o’clock at 
night that she was on her way back to the hospital. Things moved 
quickly, and unfortunately we were not able to make it to Portland in 
time for the birth (for which I will continue to harbor resentment at the 
drafters of Washington’s surrogacy law for some time to come). But our 
surrogate’s doula was kind enough to call at the moment of birth and 
play the sound of our daughter’s first cry over the car’s speakerphone. 
At the hospital, everything went smoothly. Our surrogate was holding 
our daughter for us, with her doula and son present to keep her company. 
Our attorney had already faxed the court order to the hospital, which had 
a separate room next to our surrogate’s room for us and our daughter. 
Our surrogate checked out of the hospital about twelve hours later and 
returned to her pre-surrogacy life. We spent a few nights at the hospital 
learning the ropes of feeding and changing, and then it was back to 
Seattle to begin our new adventure as parents. 
152. See, e,g., Gail Steinberg & Beth Hall, Bonding and Attachment: How Does Adoption Affect a 
Newborn?, PACT’S POINT OF VIEW, http://www.pactadopt.org/app/servlet/documentapp.Display 
Document?DocID=235 (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
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G. Legally Motherless 
In general, our experience as new parents is no different than that of 
other couples: sleepless nights, lots of diaper changes, and countless 
photos of adorable moments in our daughter’s daily life. Nonetheless, as 
a male couple we encountered a few practical and legal challenges along 
the way. 
For starters, in every pre-birth class we took or parenting book we 
read, we were bombarded with the message “breast is best,” referring to 
the campaign to encourage parents to feed their children breast milk, not 
formula, due to the many health benefits of the former. These messages 
made us (and the many women who are physically unable to produce 
sufficient breast milk) feel guilty, for we were cognizant of the fact that 
no matter how hard either of us tried to mother, the limitations of nature 
would prevent either of us from producing breast milk. Wanting our 
daughter to receive a good start in life, we broached the topic with our 
surrogate, who agreed to pump, freeze, and ship breast milk to us on a 
periodic basis. As a result of this arrangement, we were able to provide 
her with a partial breast milk diet for almost the first six months of her 
life. As with the gestational process, we compensated our surrogate for 
her efforts in this regard, yet as with surrogacy, the discomfort of 
pumping breast milk is not something a woman goes through solely for 
the modest compensation one receives.153 
Second, I was surprised to learn that despite my role as my daughter’s 
primary caregiver, I was not entitled to a single day of paid parental 
leave at the University of Washington. Under the University’s official 
policy, what everyone on campus refers to as paid parental leave is 
officially a medical leave of up to twelve weeks to recover from giving 
birth. Under this policy, female employees who adopt children (or whose 
children are born to a surrogate) and all male employees are denied paid 
parental leave, even if they are a child’s primary or sole caregiver.154 
153. Breast milk is currently valued on the private “market” at about $1.00 to $2.50 per ounce 
when sold directly between producer and consumer and between $4.00 and $5.00 per ounce when 
purchased from private or non-profit milk banks. See Judy Dutton, Liquid Gold: The Booming 
Market for Human Breast Milk, WIRED MAG. (May 17, 2011, 10:05 PM), http://www.wired.com/ 
2011/05/ff_milk/all/. 
154. This policy raises a whole host of constitutional questions that are beyond the scope of this 
paper. The policy on its face technically discriminates on the basis of pregnancy status and not sex, 
and thus is presumptively subject only to rational basis review. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 
484 (1974). Yet if—as I strongly suspect—its true purpose was to deny paid leave to male 
employees, and if evidence of that true purpose could be uncovered, it would be subject to 
intermediate scrutiny as a sex-based classification, despite the fact that it also discriminates against 
female employees. Cf. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 232 (1985) (“[A]n additional purpose to 
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Finally, government agencies still find it hard to grasp the concept of 
someone being legally motherless.155 On more than one occasion I 
would be asked by a government agency “where the mother was,” and 
when I responded that she had no legal mother, I would get a snide 
response, “well she had to come out of somewhere.” Indeed, I am listed 
as my daughter’s mother on one Washington State public health record 
because their computer system does not allow for the possibility of 
someone without a mother. Ironically, thanks to this little bit of 
bureaucratic inertia and in spite of Washington State’s efforts to prevent 
discriminate against poor whites would not render nugatory the purpose to discriminate against all 
blacks.”). Moreover, to the extent that this policy, on its face, denies the bonding time associated 
with paid parental leave to a certain class of children, namely, those who are adopted or born via 
surrogacy arrangements, it should also be subjected to heightened scrutiny when examined from the 
vantage point not of the parents, but instead the children harmed by such a policy. See United States 
v. Windsor, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (declaring the federal Defense of Marriage 
Act unconstitutional, and noting the injuries the law poses to the children of same-sex couples); 
Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1983) (noting that heightened scrutiny applies to illegitimacy 
classifications, reasoning that it is unjust to punish children for their parent’s conduct); Plyler v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (applying heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate against 
children of illegal aliens, employing the same logic). In all events, the policy is surprisingly 
regressive when compared with other universities, which provide paid leave to any parent, male or 
female, and regardless of whether their child is born naturally or the result of surrogacy or adoption, 
so long as the parent meets the definition of “primary caregiver.” Examples include Faculty 
Parental Leave, SYRACUSE U., HUM. RESOURCES, http://humanresources.syr.edu/resources/ 
faculty/faculty-parental-leave/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); FAQ: Paid Parental Leave, U. OF MD., 
FAC. HANDBOOK, http://www.faculty.umd.edu/faculty/leave_ppl_faq.html (last visited Oct. 19, 
2014); Interim Faculty Parental Leave Policy, CASE W. RES. U., https://www.case.edu/ 
president/facsen/pdfs/Paid_Parental_Leave_interim_policy_Faculty.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); 
Leaves of Absence for Reasons of Pregnancy, Childbirth, and Child Care, SARAH LAWRENCE C., 
HUM. RESOURCES, http://www.slc.edu/offices-services/human-resources/time-off/Childcare_ 
Leave.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); Paid Parental Leave, DUKE U., HUM. RESOURCES, 
http://www.hr.duke.edu/policies/time_away/loa/parental.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); Parental 
Leave, TUFTS U., https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/wfb/Parental+leave (last modified 
Aug. 26, 2014); Parental Leave, VAND. U., HUM. RESOURCES (July 1, 2014), 
http://hr.vanderbilt.edu/policies/ParentalLeave.php; Parental Leave Policy, ADAMS ST. U. 1–4, 
http://www.adams.edu/president/parentalleavepolicy.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); Parental 
Leave Policy–Staff, WASH. & LEE U., HUM. RESOURCES, http://www.wlu.edu/human-resources/ 
benefits/time-off-leave-and-disability/parental-leave/parental-leave-policy-staff (last visited Oct. 19, 
2014); Parental Leave–Staff, WAKE FOREST U., HUM. RESOURCES POLICIES & PROCS. 1 (2013), 
http://hr.wfu.edu/files/2013/08/WFU-Section-V-1-Parental-Leave-Staff-8.2.13.pdf (last visited Oct. 
19, 2014); Staff Handbook: Other Paid Leaves, WESLEYAN U., HUM. RESOURCES, 
http://www.wesleyan.edu/hr/handbook/otherpaid.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); Staff Handbook: 
Time-Off Benefits & Leave Plans, SMITH C., http://www.smith.edu/hr/handbook_512.php (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2014). In all events, I am grateful to the law school’s administration, which made 
significant efforts to offset the negative effects of the University’s official leave policy. 
155. This same phenomenon appears in some court rulings in which parties are trying to establish 
parentage that does not involve a legal mother. See In re Paternity of Infant T., 991 N.E.2d 596, 
599–601 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013); In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 132 (Md. 2007) (Cathell, J., 
dissenting); id. at 142 (Harrell, J., dissenting); In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 729 (Tenn. 2005). 
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compensated surrogacy from taking place, I was—both in a nurturing 
sense and at least on one official document—able to accomplish my goal 
of becoming a “mother” after all. 
II. THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE VIA SURROGACY 
A. Introduction 
One of the more contested areas in federal constitutional law concerns 
the ability of federal courts to recognize and enforce unenumerated 
“fundamental” rights. Ever since the nation’s founding, Supreme Court 
Justices have sparred on the question whether the power to do so even 
exists.156 Moreover, even when the Court has felt empowered to 
recognize such rights, Justices have found that power grounded in 
different provisions of the Constitution,157 including the Due Process,158 
Equal Protection,159 and Privileges or Immunities160 Clauses, as well as 
the “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights161 and the Ninth Amendment.162 
Indeed, some established fundamental rights—such as the right to 
marry—have been grounded in different constitutional provisions in 
different cases.163 
Much of the Court’s vacillation in the early-to-mid-twentieth century 
amongst various constitutional hooks for recognizing and enforcing 
unenumerated “fundamental” rights can be explained as a conscious 
effort by the Court to avoid reliance on the Due Process Clause. This is 
because invocation of that clause in the economic substantive due 
156. Compare Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387–89 (1798) (Opinion of Chase, J.) 
(contending that federal courts have the power to strike down a law even if it does not violate a right 
expressly enumerated in the U.S. Constitution), with id. at 398–99 (Opinion of Iredell, J.) 
(contending that the federal courts can only strike down a law if it violates a right expressly 
enumerated in the U.S. Constitution). See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 755–
65 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring). 
157. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 755–65 (Souter, J., concurring) (“American constitutional 
practice in recognizing unenumerated, substantive limits on governmental action . . . has [not] rested 
on any single textual basis.”). 
158. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
159. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. 
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
160. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3059–88 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (identifying privileges or immunities clause as basis for incorporating and applying 
Second Amendment against the states); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502–04 (1999) (right to travel).  
161. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–85 (1965). 
162. See id. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
163. Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (Due Process Clause), with Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382 (1978) (Equal Protection Clause).  
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process cases of the so-called Lochner era had only recently been 
repudiated by the Court.164 In general, modern Supreme Court precedent 
has since re-characterized most previously recognized fundamental 
rights as being grounded in the Due Process Clause even if they were 
previously recognized under a different constitutional provision,165 
although a few lines of fundamental rights precedent continue to rely 
upon one of the other clauses.166 
If a law infringes upon a fundamental right that has already been 
established as such by the U.S. Supreme Court, one can proceed directly 
to the application of the appropriate level of scrutiny to determine 
whether it passes constitutional muster. Traditionally, laws infringing 
upon fundamental rights are said to be subject to strict scrutiny, and will 
be upheld only if they are narrowly tailored to further a compelling 
164. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 
55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 112, 123 (2007); G. Edward White, The Anti-Judge: William O. Douglas and 
the Ambiguities of Individuality, 74 VA. L. REV. 17, 65–72 (1988).  
165. Thus, for example, the right to procreate, although originally recognized as fundamental 
under the Equal Protection Clause, see Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942), has since been re-characterized as being a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause, 
see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573–74 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 846–51 (1992) (joint opinion); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 
(1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973). 
166. Constitutional scholarship and precedent does recognize one important difference between 
fundamental rights protected solely by the Equal Protection Clause and those protected by the Due 
Process Clause. If a right is deemed fundamental under the Due Process Clause, infringements upon 
that right are subject to heightened scrutiny even if the government is evenhanded and infringes 
upon everyone’s ability to exercise that right. In contrast, fundamental rights protected by the Equal 
Protection Clause can be infringed upon or even eliminated by the government without raising any 
constitutional concerns, so long as it does so evenhandedly; it is only if it infringes upon or denies 
the right to some individuals but not others that the government’s conduct is subject to heightened 
scrutiny. The right to an abortion is a paradigmatic example of a due process fundamental right: 
even if the government is evenhanded in denying the right to everyone, the law is subject to 
heightened scrutiny. In contrast, the right to vote is a paradigmatic example of an equal protection 
right: the government need not extend that right at all for particular governmental positions, but 
once it chooses to extend that right, it must do so evenhandedly, with the failure to do so being 
subject to heightened scrutiny. See Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC 
L. REV. 27, 30–37 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the 
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1168–69 
(1988); Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1375, 1412–20 (2010). Since declaring something to be an equal protection fundamental right 
is somewhat weaker medicine than declaring it to be a due process right, in some instances, where 
the government is denying an alleged fundamental right to some people but not others, the Court 
might invoke the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Due Process Clause, reserving its stronger 
medicine for a later point in time in which the government more broadly denies the right at issue. 
See Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111–12 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); 
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 543–45 (Stone, C.J., concurring); id. at 546–47 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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governmental interest.167 However, the Court has explicitly articulated a 
lower level of scrutiny—the undue burden test—for laws infringing 
upon the fundamental right to obtain an abortion.168 Moreover, the Court 
has recited a test in a case involving the fundamental right to marry that 
sounds akin to the intermediate scrutiny employed in the class-based 
equal protection context for sex and legitimacy classifications,169 and has 
failed to articulate an explicit standard of review in its more recent 
fundamental rights cases,170 leading some lower courts to recognize an 
emerging test—at least for some newly recognized fundamental rights—
that seems more akin to intermediate scrutiny.171 Moreover, unlike in the 
class-based equal protection context, where one must show an intent to 
discriminate against a given class—not mere discriminatory effects 
against a given class—in order to make out a constitutional claim,172 
where fundamental rights are involved, it suffices to show that a law 
affects, burdens, or interferes with a fundamental right without showing 
an intent specifically to do so.173 
Yet, it is not always clear whether a litigant’s claim falls within the 
scope of an existing fundamental right or if instead the litigant is seeking 
167. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); Roe, 410 U.S. at 155–56; 
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
168. Although in its early cases, the Court applied strict scrutiny to laws infringing upon the right 
to obtain an abortion, see Roe, 410 U.S. at 155–56, it subsequently replaced it with the undue 
burden test, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 874–79 (joint opinion); id. at 929–30 (Blackmun, J., concurring 
in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); id. at 964–65 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). A more recent case had language 
suggesting that the Court was applying some form of heightened rational basis review. See Gonzales 
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158, 166 (2007); id. at 187 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
169. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–88 (1978). In another case involving the 
fundamental right to marry, the Court applied a heightened form of rational basis review, but that 
was because the case involved the special context of constitutional rights in the prison setting. See 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91, 96–99 (1987). 
170. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion failed 
to apply strict scrutiny review); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (noting that the majority opinion failed to articulate the appropriate standard of review, 
and contending that it should be strict scrutiny). 
171. See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 51–56 (1st Cir. 2008); Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 
806, 817–19 (9th Cir. 2008); cf. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 479–84 
(9th Cir. 2014) (in the equal protection context, similarly interpreting the Court’s silence on the 
level of scrutiny as applying an intermediate level of review). 
172. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–42 (1976). 
173. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (joint opinion) (noting, in the abortion context, that either intent 
or effect suffice); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (distinguishing laws that “burden” a 
fundamental right and those that “target” a suspect class); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 
U.S. 450, 457–58 (1988) (distinguishing a law that “interferes” with a fundamental right from one 
that “discriminates” against a suspect class). 
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to establish a new, as-yet unrecognized fundamental right. This is 
because a claimed right can be broadly described in a way that makes it 
fit within an existing line of fundamental rights precedents, or it can be 
narrowly described in a way that sets it apart from previously recognized 
fundamental rights. The distinction between the two characterizations is 
of critical importance in determining the appropriate level of 
constitutional scrutiny to apply to the law. If a court concludes that a 
litigant’s claim falls within the scope of an existing fundamental right, it 
can simply proceed to apply strict or some other form of heightened 
scrutiny to the law. Yet if a court instead concludes that a litigant’s claim 
seeks to establish a new fundamental right, it must first determine 
whether such a right exists and only if it concludes that it does then 
apply some heightened form of scrutiny to the law. 
A perfect example of such rights-framing ambiguity exists in the 
recent string of cases challenging state laws prohibiting same-sex 
marriage. Some courts characterize the right at issue generally as 
“marriage,” and proceed to apply the heightened scrutiny employed by 
the Court in its trilogy of cases174 in which it has treated marriage as a 
fundamental right,175 while others contend that the existing fundamental 
right to marry refers to opposite-sex marriage, characterize the right at 
issue narrowly as “same-sex marriage,” and proceed to apply the Court’s 
precedents for determining whether or not to recognize a new 
fundamental right.176 
In addition to the lack of consensus regarding how to frame a right for 
purposes of fundamental rights analysis, lower courts are not of one 
mind on what they are supposed to look to in deciding whether the right 
exists. Thus, lower courts split on whether they must find that the right 
at issue is deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition,177 or if 
contemporary practice is also a relevant consideration.178 
174. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 78; Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
175. See Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1209–18 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
265 (2014); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 651, 658–59 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Golinski v. 
U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 982 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2012); In re Marriage Cases, 
183 P.3d 384, 420–21, 421 n.33, 429–30 (Cal. 2008). 
176. See Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1071, 1094–96 (D. Haw. 2012); In re 
Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 674–75 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010); Conaway v. Deane, 932 
A.2d 571, 617–24 (Md. 2007); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 976–99 (Wash. 2006); 
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E. 2d 1, 9–10 (N.Y. 2006); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 55–57 (Haw. 
1993). 
177. See Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1239–44 (11th Cir. 2004). 
178. See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 54 (1st Cir. 2008); Williams, 378 F.3d at 1252–59 (Barkett, 
J., dissenting); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1308–09 
(11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
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This split amongst the lower courts follows from a degree of doctrinal 
confusion in the Court’s own fundamental rights precedents, and is 
important for addressing the constitutionality of laws that either prohibit 
or deter people from pursuing surrogacy, as well as laws that prevent 
such persons from establishing legal parentage of the children born via 
surrogacy. 
B. The Framing and Recognition of Fundamental Rights 
Much of the confusion surrounding both the question of framing 
rights for purposes of fundamental rights analysis as well as the 
appropriate sources to look to in determining whether to recognize such 
rights, so framed, can be traced to the Court itself wavering on both of 
these issues over the course of the past several decades as shifting 
majorities have decided fundamental rights cases. Differences of opinion 
regarding these two inquiries almost certainly reflect the Justices’ 
predisposition in favor or against recognition of unenumerated 
fundamental rights. If one’s judicial philosophy is hostile to the 
recognition of such rights, insisting on narrowly framing the right at 
issue and asking whether the right, so framed, is deeply rooted in history 
and tradition will result in only rarely recognizing such rights. In 
contrast, if one’s judicial philosophy favors recognition of such rights, 
allowing for broad framing of the right at issue and/or consideration of 
modern trends in addition to history and tradition, makes recognition of 
fundamental rights far more likely. 
In general, the Court’s cases prior to its 1986 decision in Bowers v. 
Hardwick179 tended to frame the right at issue in somewhat more general 
terms. Thus, for example, when considering in Skinner v. Oklahoma180 a 
challenge to a law providing for the sterilization of convicted criminals, 
the Court spoke generally of the right to “procreation.”181 When the 
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut182 considered the constitutionality of a 
state law prohibiting married couples from obtaining contraception, the 
Court framed the right at issue as the right to “privacy surrounding the 
marriage relationship.”183 When considering the constitutionality of laws 
prohibiting interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia,184 marriage by 
179. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
180. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
181. Id. at 541. 
182. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
183. Id. at 486. 
184. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 
                                                     
13 - Nicolas_Final for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/16/2014 6:32 PM 
1272 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:1235 
those with outstanding child support obligations in Zablocki v. 
Redhail,185 and marriage by prisoners in Turner v. Safley,186 the Court 
framed the right at issue in all of those cases more generally as the right 
“to marry,”187 not more narrowly as the rights to interracial marriage, 
deadbeat dad marriage, and prisoner marriage.188 And when the Court in 
Roe v. Wade189 considered the constitutionality of laws prohibiting or 
severely restricting the ability to obtain an abortion, the Court 
characterized the fundamental right at issue as a “right of personal 
privacy” that was broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.190 
In recognizing the rights at issue in these pre-Bowers cases as 
fundamental, the Court stressed the fact that the rights at issue were 
deeply rooted in history. Thus, for example, in Griswold, the Court 
described the right to marital privacy at issue in the case as “a right of 
privacy older than the Bill of Rights.”191 And in Roe, the Court carefully 
examined the history of abortion regulation, and found pertinent that 
there had been a long history at common law and in early U.S. history of 
only limited regulation of abortion before states started to enact more 
restrictive abortion laws,192 that the Roe Court described as being “of 
relatively recent vintage.”193 Thus, in these various pre-Bowers cases, 
history was pertinent because it demonstrated that the laws at issue 
curtailed liberties that had a long history of being exercised free of 
governmental interference. As Cass Sunstein has explained, in this 
regard the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause has been 
interpreted by the Court “to protect traditional practices against short-run 
departures . . . brought about by temporary majorities who are 
insufficiently sensitive to the claims of history.”194 
185. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
186. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
187. See id. at 95; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
188. See Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1209–18 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
265 (2014); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 651, 658–59 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Golinski v. 
U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 982 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2012); In re Marriage Cases, 
183 P.3d 384, 420–21 & n.33, 429–30 (Cal. 2008). 
189. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
190. Id. at 129, 152–53. 
191. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
192. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 113, 132–36, 138–41 (1973). 
193. Id. at 129. 
194. Sunstein, supra note 166, 1163 (1988); accord Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 377 n.12 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (Anderson, J., dissenting) (citing Sunstein, supra note 166, at 1171); Dean v. 
D.C., 653 A.2d 307, 342 (D.C. 1993) (Ferren, A.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
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In 1986, the Court in Bowers considered a due process challenge to a 
state law that made sodomy a crime—whether consensual or not and 
whether between persons of the same or opposite sex—as applied to 
consensual sodomy between two persons of the same sex.195 In Bowers, 
the Court rejected a more general framing of the right at issue as a right 
to “private sexual conduct between consenting adults,” instead framing 
the rights inquiry more specifically as one of whether there was “a 
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”196 Having 
so framed the right, the Court then concluded that it was not deeply 
rooted in history but instead that proscriptions against sodomy have 
“ancient roots,” noting that it was a criminal offense at common law and 
in all of the thirteen colonies, that when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified all but five states criminalized sodomy, that until 1961 all fifty 
states criminalized it, and that at the time of the decision about half of 
the states still criminalized sodomy.197 In a separate concurring opinion, 
Chief Justice Burger added to the majority’s historical analysis, writing 
that “[d]ecisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have 
been subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western 
civilization.”198 Specifically, he noted that “[c]ondemnation of those 
practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical 
standards” and that “[h]omosexual sodomy was a capital crime under 
Roman law.”199 
Three years later, the Court, in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,200 considered 
a substantive due process challenge to a state law that conclusively 
presumes a woman’s husband to be the father of any children born to her 
during the marriage, with only a limited time period (two years) for 
either the husband or wife—but not third persons—to use blood tests to 
challenge the presumption.201 The challenge to the statute was brought 
by a man who had an affair with a married woman and claimed to be the 
genetic father to a child she bore.202 While the dissent argued for a more 
general framing of the question as “whether parenthood is an interest 
(quoting Sunstein, supra note 166, at 1163); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 718 (1989) 
(Norris, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Sunstein, supra note 166, at 1163 (1988)). 
195. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 186 n.1, 187–88 (1986). 
196. Id. at 190–91. 
197. Id. at 192–94. 
198. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
199. Id. at 196–97. 
200. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
201. See id. at 117–18 (plurality opinion). 
202. See id. at 113–16 (plurality opinion). 
 
                                                     
13 - Nicolas_Final for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/16/2014 6:32 PM 
1274 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:1235 
that historically has received our attention and protection,”203 the 
plurality penned by Justice Scalia framed it more narrowly as “the power 
of the natural father to assert parental rights over a child born into a 
woman’s existing marriage with another man,”204 or alternatively, “the 
rights of the natural father of a child adulterously conceived.”205 On the 
issue of framing for substantive due process claims, the plurality more 
generally wrote that “[w]e refer to the most specific level at which a 
relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right 
can be identified.”206 With respect to the appropriate source to look to in 
determining whether such a right existed, the plurality cited both Roe 
and Bowers for the proposition that “historical traditions” were the 
appropriate focal point.207 Noting that the law at issue—the presumption 
of legitimacy and the fact that it could not be challenged by anyone other 
than the husband or wife (and in many cases, not even by them)—was a 
fundamental principle of common law and the law of most states for 
much of U.S. history, akin to the sodomy laws at issue in Bowers and in 
stark contrast to the absence of such a longstanding history for restrictive 
abortion laws of the sort at issue in Roe, the plurality rejected the natural 
father’s substantive due process claim.208 
In Michael H., however, only four Justices agreed that the framing of 
rights for purposes of fundamental rights analysis must always be at a 
very specific level. On this point, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy wrote 
separately to note that this approach “may be somewhat inconsistent 
with our past decisions in this area,” and, citing the Court’s decisions in 
Griswold, Loving, and Turner, wrote that “[o]n occasion the Court has 
characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of 
generality that might not be ‘the most specific level’ available.”209 Three 
years later, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey210—in a decision reaffirming the right of a woman to decide 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy—these two moderate Justices 
in their “joint opinion” with Justice Souter, once again rejected the idea 
that fundamental rights should always be framed “at the most specific 
203. Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
204. Id. at 125 (plurality opinion). 
205. See id. at 127 n.6. 
206. Id. 
207. See id. 
208. See id. at 124–27, 126 n.6. 
209. Id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). 
210. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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level” possible.211 They wrote that “such a view would be inconsistent 
with our law,” noting that “interracial marriage” was illegal in most 
States for much of U.S. history but the Court nonetheless concluded that 
laws prohibiting it violated the substantive component of the due process 
clause.212 Indeed, at one point the joint opinion used breathtakingly 
general language to describe the rights substantively protected by the 
Due Process Clause, writing that “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to 
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and 
of the mystery of human life.”213 
While the Court in Casey, just like the Court in Michael H., was 
unable to get a majority of Justices to agree upon a methodology for 
framing and identifying fundamental rights, five years later, in 
Washington v. Glucksberg,214 an opinion for the Court finally set forth 
such a methodology. At issue in the case was whether a law making it a 
crime to assist someone in committing suicide ran afoul of a 
fundamental right guaranteed by the substantive component of the Due 
Process Clause.215 
In Glucksberg, the Court held that identifying fundamental rights 
requires a two-part inquiry: First, the court must articulate a “careful 
description” of the right at stake and second, it must ask whether the 
right, so described, is “objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ 
such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were 
sacrificed.’”216 With respect to the “careful description” prong, the Court 
appeared to equate “careful” with precise or narrow, holding that the 
right at issue was not properly framed more generally as the “right to 
die” or the right to “control of one’s final days,” but more specifically as 
“a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in 
doing so.”217 Having so narrowly and specifically framed the right, the 
Court canvassed the historical record and, having found that assisting 
suicide was criminalized at common law, in the colonies, and most of 
the states at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, concluded 
that the right was thus not deeply rooted in history and tradition, and, 
accordingly, that it was not a fundamental right protected by the Due 
211. Id. at 847–48 (joint opinion). 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 851. 
214. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
215. Id. at 705–07. 
216. Id. at 720–21. 
217. Id. at 722–24. 
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Process Clause.218 Thus, Glucksberg seemed to resolve the debate over 
framing and recognizing fundamental rights in favor of rather narrow 
framing and a focus on deep-rooted history and tradition. 
However, the continued vitality of the Glucksberg methodology has 
been uncertain since the Court issued its 2003 opinion in Lawrence v. 
Texas,219 in which the Court overruled its earlier decision in Bowers and 
declared that laws criminalizing sodomy violate the substantive 
component of the due process clause. In overruling Bowers, the 
Lawrence Court criticized several aspects of the methodology framed in 
that case. First, with respect to framing the right at issue, the Lawrence 
Court held that Bowers framed the right at issue too narrowly—as the 
right to engage in homosexual sodomy—and suggested instead that it 
should be more broadly framed as the right to engage in sexual activity 
in private within the confines of a personal relationship.220 Next, the 
Court made two important methodological points with respect to the 
Bowers Court’s historical analysis. First, in considering the historical 
record, the Lawrence Court, while acknowledging the long-standing 
presence of laws criminalizing sodomy, noted that there was a history of 
nonenforcement of such laws against consenting adults acting in private, 
and that this nonenforcement—despite facial applicability—was 
tantamount to a history of non-interference with the right at issue.221 
Second, the Court noted that these early laws were targeted at sodomy 
generally, not specifically toward homosexual sodomy, and that it was 
not until the last third of the twentieth century that legislatures began to 
enact laws specifically targeting homosexual sodomy,222 thus echoing 
Roe’s focus on the laws at issue being of “relatively recent vintage.”223 
Third, in contrast to Chief Justice Burger’s focus on early history, the 
Lawrence Court noted that “our laws and traditions in the past half 
century are of most relevance here,” which the Court described as 
218. See id. at 710–16, 723, 728. The Glucksberg Court acknowledged Casey’s broad statement 
that “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life,” but held that this statement was simply a general 
description of those rights that the Court had found in the past to be protected by the due process 
clause, and not a prescriptive test for identifying such rights. Id. at 726–27 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. 
at 851). 
219. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
220. See id. at 566–67. In addition, the Court also cited Casey’s broad statement that “[a]t the 
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
and of the mystery of human life.” Id. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
221. See id. at 569–70, 572–73. 
222. See id. at 570. 
223. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973). 
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showing “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection 
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters 
pertaining to sex” that “should have been apparent when Bowers was 
decided.”224 The Court then proceeded to consider a variety of more 
contemporary developments extant at the time Bowers was decided that 
demonstrated this “emerging awareness,” including (1) the 1955 Model 
Penal Code’s recommendation that there be no criminal penalties for 
sexual relations conducted in private; (2) that soon thereafter, Illinois 
and other states repealed their criminal penalties for consensual sodomy; 
(3) that states with sodomy laws on the books were not enforcing them; 
and (4) that sodomy laws were repealed in the United Kingdom and that 
the European Court of Human Rights declared such laws to violate the 
European Convention on Human Rights.225 The Lawrence Court thus 
concluded that “[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all 
cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”226 
Lawrence thus seemed, in effect, to overrule or at least modify 
Glucksberg in that it both indicated that the framing should not be 
unduly narrow and that it did not require an exclusive focus on deep-
rooted history and tradition. But this conclusion is not universally 
accepted, in large part because lower courts are split on the question 
whether Lawrence is even a fundamental rights case.227 This is because 
Lawrence, while criticizing Bowers, never explicitly articulated that it 
was recognizing a fundamental right and did not explicitly state that it 
was applying strict or some other form of heightened scrutiny, and 
instead merely concluded that the law at issue furthers “no legitimate 
state interest,” the language of rational basis review.228 Indeed, in his 
dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia characterized the majority’s decision 
as merely overturning Bowers’ holding that sodomy laws are justified by 
a legitimate governmental interest, and that the majority left intact the 
Bowers Court’s holding that it was not a fundamental right, and thus, 
presumably, the methodology it employed for framing and recognizing 
224. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–72. 
225. See id. at 572–73. 
226. Id. at 572 (citation omitted). 
227. Compare Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236–38 (11th Cir. 2004) (not a 
fundamental rights case), and Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 
815–17 (11th Cir. 2004) (same), with Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 817–18 (9th Cir. 
2008) (treating it as a not-quite-fundamental right subject to intermediate scrutiny), Cook v. Gates, 
528 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2008) (same), Williams, 378 F.3d at 1252–56 (Barkett, J., dissenting) 
(fundamental rights case), and Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 
1275, 1304–07 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
228. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; see also id. at 586, 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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fundamental rights.229 
Some lower court judges, in line with Justice Scalia’s dissent, note 
that Lawrence never engaged in the Glucksberg two-step analysis, did 
not explicitly say it was overruling Glucksberg, and did not explicitly 
state that it was recognizing a fundamental right or applying strict 
scrutiny.230 They thus treat Lawrence as merely a case holding that the 
law at issue did not pass rational basis review under the Due Process 
Clause, and continue to apply Glucksberg’s methodology.231 
Accordingly, in addition to requiring that the right at issue be narrowly 
framed,232 these courts reject an examination of contemporary trends 
when conducting fundamental rights analyses.233 
Yet other lower court judges—noting that the Lawrence Court clearly 
placed its decision within its due process fundamental rights line of 
cases and required the government to justify the law, a hallmark of 
heightened rather than rational basis review—conclude that Lawrence 
was either a fundamental rights case applying strict scrutiny234 or 
something akin to a semi-fundamental rights case applying something 
like intermediate scrutiny.235 These judges thus conclude that Lawrence, 
coming after Glucksberg, must be viewed as clarifying or modifying 
both aspects of the Glucksberg analysis. First, with respect to the level at 
which rights must be framed, these judges conclude that Glucksberg’s 
“careful description”236 requirement is not synonymous with framing the 
liberty interest in the narrowest fashion possible.237 And second, with 
229. See id. at 586, 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
230. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355, 360–62 (5th Cir. 2008) (Garza, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Witt, 548 F.3d at 1273–75 (O’Scannlain, J., 
dissenting); Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 769–72 (10th Cir. 2008); Muth v. Frank, 
412 F.3d 808, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2005); Williams, 378 F.3d at 1234–38; Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of 
Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815–17 (11th Cir. 2004). 
231. See Reliable Consultants, Inc., 538 F.3d at 360–62 (Jones, C.J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc); Witt, 548 F.3d at 1273–75 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting); Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 
769–72; Muth, 412 F.3d at 817–18; Williams, 378 F.3d at 1234–38; Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of 
Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, at 815–17 (11th Cir. 2004). 
232. See Witt, 548 F.3d at 1273–75 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting); Williams, 378 F.3d at 1239–50; 
Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, at 816–17 (11th Cir. 2004). 
233. See Williams, 378 F.3d at 1239–44. 
234. See id. at 1252–59 (Barkett, J., dissenting); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family 
Services, 377 F.3d 1275, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing 
en banc). 
235. See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 51–56 (1st Cir. 2008); Witt, 527 F.3d at 817–19. 
236. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citations omitted). 
237. See Cook, 528 F.3d at 54; Williams, 378 F.3d at 1252–59 (Barkett, J., dissenting); Lofton v. 
Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
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respect to the role of history and tradition, these courts hold that they 
provide a starting point but not always the ending point, with 
contemporary trends and practices also being a valid consideration.238 
With the impact that Lawrence had on Glucksberg thus unsettled, in 
the pages that follow I will address the fundamental rights claims 
following both the Glucksberg methodology as well as any potential 
modifications that Lawrence has made to that methodology. 
C. The Fundamental Right to Enter into Surrogacy Arrangements 
One of the most long-standing fundamental rights recognized by the 
U.S. Supreme Court is the right to procreate, which was first recognized 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1942 in Skinner v. Oklahoma.239 At issue 
in Skinner was a state law that provided for the sterilization of those 
convicted three times of certain crimes but not those convicted of other 
crimes.240 The Court described the right at issue as “a right which is 
basic to the perpetuation of a race—the right to have offspring.”241 The 
Court treated the problem as one of equal protection, and held that where 
what are involved are rights fundamental to the human race—which it 
denominated as “[m]arriage and procreation”—strict scrutiny was 
applicable.242 In explaining the importance of strict scrutiny in the 
procreation context, the Court reasoned not only that “[t]he power to 
sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating 
effects” but that “[i]n evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types 
which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear.”243 
Although in Skinner, the Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause, 
subsequent cases have characterized the right at issue there as protected 
by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.244 Moreover, 
Skinner and the right to procreation recognized therein have served as 
the building block of many other subsequently recognized fundamental 
rights. Thus, for example, Loving relied on Skinner’s dicta regarding 
238. See Cook, 528 F.3d at 54; Williams, 378 F.3d at 1252–59 (Barkett, J., dissenting); Lofton v. 
Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Services, 377 F.3d 1275, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, 
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
239. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
240. Id. at 536–37. 
241. Id. at 536. 
242. Id. at 541. 
243. Id. 
244. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573–74 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–51 (1992) (joint opinion); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 
684–85 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973). 
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“[m]arriage and procreation”245 for its conclusion that marriage was a 
fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause.246 And the 
Court’s cases regarding contraception and abortion—all of which 
involve the right not to procreate—are derivative of and rely upon the 
right to procreate recognized in Skinner.247 
So strong is the right to procreate recognized in Skinner and so 
stringent is the strict scrutiny associated with infringements on that right 
that lower courts have felt compelled to strike down laws even in 
circumstances in which the government’s rationale for restricting that 
right seems reasonable. Thus, courts have struck down probation 
conditions that prevent those convicted of nonsupport of existing 
children248 or possession of child pornography from fathering 
children,249 or probation conditions that prohibit a woman from getting 
pregnant who has been convicted of drug use and possession,250 child 
endangerment,251 or child neglect resulting in death.252 
Since surrogacy arrangements are nearly always pursued by couples 
who are otherwise unable to procreate without the assistance of third 
parties,253 the most certain way to have laws declared unconstitutional 
that make it a crime to enter into surrogacy arrangements, or that 
otherwise seek to deter them, is to frame the right at issue as the right to 
procreate and to apply the strict scrutiny associated with infringements 
upon that right. 
Yet the same rights-framing quandary that courts are grappling with 
in cases challenging the constitutionality of laws prohibiting same-sex 
marriage is present in cases challenging laws prohibiting surrogacy. 
245. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added). 
246. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
247. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (1972); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965); id. at 502–03 (White, J., concurring); id. at 496–97 
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (reasoning that if it were constitutional to criminalize the use of 
contraception, it would likewise be constitutional for the government to forcibly sterilize people 
who have had two children). 
248. See State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201, 1203–07 (Ohio 2004). 
249. See United States v. Scalise, 398 F. App’x 736, 742 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Loy, 
237 F.3d 251, 269 (3d Cir. 2001). 
250. See People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). 
251. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364–66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
252. See Trammel v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283, 288–91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 
253. The one exception is so-called “social surrogacy,” in which a woman otherwise able 
medically to become pregnant and give birth hires a surrogate to avoid either ruining her figure or 
impacting her career. See Sarah Elizabeth Richards, Should a Woman Be Allowed to Hire a 
Surrogate Because She Fears Pregnancy Will Hurt Her Career?, ELLE (Apr. 17, 2014), 
http://www.elle.com/life-love/society-career/birth-rights. 
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Thus, while some courts have characterized laws that restrict surrogacy 
as falling within the established fundamental right to procreate,254 others 
declare that this pre-existing right is about natural procreation, and that 
what is at issue is a newly claimed fundamental right to procreate with 
the assistance of technology and third parties.255 Moreover, where only 
one of the intended parents seeks to use their genetic material in the 
process—such as in a traditional surrogacy scenario or where third-party 
donor eggs or sperm will be used—courts have held that only the 
procreative rights of that intended parent are at stake since the other 
intended parent is not, strictly speaking, procreating.256 
If Lawrence—through its criticism of Bowers for narrowly describing 
the right at issue as the right to engage in homosexual sodomy instead of 
more broadly as the right to engage in sexual activity in private within 
the confines of a personal relationship257—has modified Glucksberg’s 
“careful description” requirement,258 it would follow that in cases 
challenging laws that criminalize or otherwise restrict access to 
surrogacy, framing the right at issue as the right to procreate would be 
the appropriate level of generality. From the standpoint of a couple 
whose only hope of procreating is through the assistance of a surrogate, 
a law that criminalizes that assistance is no different than the law 
providing for the sterilization of convicted felons in Skinner: in both 
instances, the government’s action prevents the target’s ability to 
procreate. Thus, laws criminalizing or otherwise restricting surrogacy 
should be deemed constitutional only if they satisfy strict scrutiny. 
As explained above, however, some courts conclude that Lawrence 
was not a fundamental rights case, and that Glucksberg’s more 
conservative approach to framing still governs.259 Recall that in 
Glucksberg, the Court framed the right at issue in that case as the right to 
254. See J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1277–78 (D. Utah 2002); Belsito v. Clark, 644 
N.E.2d 760, 766 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994); Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484, 486 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1992). 
255. See Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1095 n.20 (D. Haw. 2012); T.M.H. v. 
D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 818–19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (Lawson, J., dissenting). 
256. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253–54 (N.J. 1988). 
257. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566–67 (2003). 
258. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citations omitted). 
259. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355, 360–62 (5th Cir. 2008) (Garza, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 548 F.3d 1264, 1273–
75 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting); Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 
762, 769–72 (10th Cir. 2008); Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2005); Williams v. 
Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1234–38 (11th Cir. 2004); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of 
Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815–17 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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commit suicide “which itself includes a right to assistance in doing 
so,”260 and then examined the extent to which law historically 
criminalized assisting suicide even when it left the act of committing or 
attempting to commit suicide alone unregulated.261 Applying 
Glucksberg’s methodology to a case involving a law restricting 
surrogacy, a court might frame the right at issue more narrowly as a right 
to procreate which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so, and 
examine the extent to which there is a deep-rooted right to procure the 
assistance of a third person for the purpose of procreating.262 It would 
seem, however, that under Glucksberg, at least for framing purposes,263 
one would not need to separately frame a right to procreate via 
traditional surrogacy and a right to procreate via gestational surrogacy. 
After all, even Glucksberg, while narrowly framing the issue, did not 
contend that for framing purposes it was necessary to distinguish, say, 
between assisted suicide by means of a gun versus by poison. 
Yet even if Glucksberg’s more conservative approach to framing still 
controls where fundamental rights are involved, I believe that the right to 
surrogacy would itself be found to be an independent fundamental right, 
and thus that the same heightened scrutiny applied to infringements upon 
other fundamental rights would follow. This is because the right to 
procure the assistance of a surrogate has an unparalleled history of being 
exercised free from governmental interference. 
1. The History of Surrogacy 
Laws criminalizing or even regulating surrogacy, either in the United 
States or elsewhere, are both rare and—to quote Roe—“are of relatively 
recent vintage.”264 The practice of surrogacy itself, although sometimes 
thought of as a relatively new phenomenon brought about by the advent 
of medical science, has been around in some form for much of recorded 
history. 
Indeed, surrogacy first appears in the Bible, where the book of 
Genesis recounts at least two instances of it. The first instance is the 
story of Sarah—the wife of Abraham—who was unable to bear 
260. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722–24 (emphasis added). 
261. See id. at 711–19. 
262. Cf. id. at 723 (framing the due process issue as the right at issue in that case as the right to 
commit suicide “which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so”). 
263. There might be different compelling governmental interests where traditional surrogacy is 
involved, however, that might justify restricting or prohibiting it under strict scrutiny analysis while 
leaving gestational surrogacy unregulated. These interests are discussed below. 
264. 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973). 
 
                                                     
13 - Nicolas_Final for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/16/20146:32 PM 
2014] STRADDLING THE COLUMBIA 1283 
children.265 They resolved their infertility problem by enlisting Sarah’s 
servant, Hagar, to serve as what would today be the equivalent of a 
traditional surrogate.266 Similarly, when Jacob’s two wives, Rachel and 
Leah, were unable to bear children, their servants likewise served as 
traditional surrogates.267 
For most of the period between Biblical times and the present, 
surrogacy was treated as an unregulated private matter that was neither 
expressly permitted nor expressly prohibited by the law. It was only in 
the early 1980s that governments began to even consider regulating 
surrogacy. The first governments to do so—the United Kingdom268 and 
Victoria, Australia269—established committees in 1982 to study the issue 
as a reaction to the first “test tube babies” being born in those two 
countries.270 In 1984, those committees both recommended the 
265. Genesis 16:1. 
266. Genesis 16:1–16. At the time these Biblical events took place, artificial insemination—the 
procedure used for impregnating modern-day traditional surrogates—had not yet developed, and so 
these early instances of surrogacy involved the intended father engaging in an act of sexual 
intercourse with the surrogate. See Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297, 1306 (Conn. 1997). While this 
would at first blush seem to violate Biblical proscriptions against adultery, the Biblical definition of 
adultery did not encompass sexual activity between a married man and an unmarried woman. See 
Peter Nicolas, The Lavender Letter: Applying the Law of Adultery to Same-Sex Couples and Same-
Sex Conduct, 63 FLA. L. REV. 97, 105–06 (2011); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Gestation: Work for Hire 
or the Essence of Motherhood? A Comparative Legal Analysis, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 91, 
120 (2002). These Biblical surrogates also differ from modern-day surrogates in that the former 
were indentured servants and thus not free to refuse their masters’ request that they serve as 
surrogates, while the latter are free to choose whether or not to serve as surrogates to intended 
parents. 
267. See Genesis 30:1–10. In recent debates over a bill to criminalize surrogacy in Kansas, 
opponents of the bill contended that it would have the effect of criminalizing the Immaculate 
Conception, characterizing the Angel Gabriel as, in effect, a surrogacy broker between God and the 
Virgin Mary. See Bryan Lowry, Kansas Lawmakers Hear Testimony on Bill Making Surrogacy 
Contracts Illegal, THE WICHITA EAGLE (Jan. 27, 2014), http://eprod.kansas.com/news/politics-
government/article1132756.html (last visited June 11, 2014); Luke 1:26–38, 2:1–40. However, the 
story of the Immaculate Conception, whereby Mary and Joseph raised Jesus perhaps suggests that 
Mary was not a surrogate in the sense we think of the term today, but rather that God was the 
equivalent of a “sperm donor.” 
268. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO 
HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY, 1984, PARL. cmnd. 9314, at iv, 4 (U.K.) [hereinafter 
THE WARNOCK REPORT], available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Warnock_Report_of_the_ 
Committee_of_Inquiry_into_Human_Fertilisation_and_Embryology_1984.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 
2014). 
269. See Explanatory Memorandum, Current Issues Brief No. 5: Assisted Reproductive 
Treatment Bill 2008 (Vict.) 16 (Austl.). 
270. See THE WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 268, at iv, 4; History of Assisted Reproductive 
Treatment in Victoria, VICTORIAN ASSISTED REPROD. TREATMENT AUTHORITY, 
http://www.varta.org.au/history-of-art-in-victoria/ (last visited July 16, 2014). 
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enactment of laws prohibiting surrogacy.271 That same year, the 
Victorian Parliament assented to a comprehensive law regulating 
assisted reproduction, including surrogacy, declaring surrogacy 
contracts—whether or not entered into for compensation—to be 
unenforceable and imposing criminal penalties for those entering into 
such arrangements,272 but the portions of the law dealing with surrogacy 
did not take effect at that time.273 
Around this same time, three highly visible instances of surrogacy 
were taking place in England, Australia, and the United States that 
served as catalysts for laws restricting or regulating surrogacy. In 1985, 
in Baby Cotton,274 a court in England resolved a custody issue in a case 
involving compensated traditional surrogacy. There was no dispute 
between the surrogate and the intended parents regarding custody, but a 
local social services agency intervened and sought to prevent the 
couple—who was from the United States—from taking custody of the 
child and taking her out of England.275 The judge ruled that the 
arrangement was proper and that the couple could take the child out of 
England, and public outrage over the case resulted in the enactment of 
the Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985,276 which made it a criminal 
offense for third parties—such as surrogacy agencies—to take part in 
commercial surrogacy. The law, however, did not make it an offense for 
the surrogate or intended parents to enter into such arrangements. 
That same year, one U.S. state, Arkansas, became the first state in the 
country to enact any legislation on the issue of surrogacy,277 but the 
statute was designed to facilitate rather than restrict surrogacy. It 
declared that in the case of an unmarried surrogate impregnated using 
artificial insemination, the intended mother—not the surrogate—is 
presumed to be the legal mother of the child278 (the statute was 
subsequently expanded to include the same presumption in situations in 
which the surrogate is married).279 The following year, Victoria, 
271. See THE WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 268, at ¶¶ 8.18–8.19; Explanatory Memorandum, 
supra note 269, at 20. 
272. See Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984 (Vict.) paras 11, 12, 13, 30 (Austl.). 
273. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 269, at 20. 
274. See Diana Brahams, The Hasty British Ban on Commercial Surrogacy, 17 HASTINGS 
CENTER REP. 16, 16–17 (1987) (discussing Baby Cotton case). 
275. See id. at 16. 
276. Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985, c. 49 (U.K.). 
277. See Joanna K. Budde, Comment, Surrogate Parenting: Future Legislation to Eliminate 
Present Inconsistencies, 26 DUQ. L. REV. 633, 653 (1988). 
278. See Act of Apr. 15, 1985, No. 904, §§ 1–2, 1985 Ark. Acts 1931, 1932. 
279. See Act of Mar. 17, 1989, No. 647, § 1, 1989 Ark. Acts 1505, 1506–07 (codified at ARK. 
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Australia put portions of its laws regulating surrogacy into effect,280 but 
it was not until 1988—following a high-profile instance of surrogacy in 
Australia which one sister served as the surrogate for the other—that the 
full force of the 1984 law was put into effect.281 
In the United States, the spark for implementing restrictive surrogacy 
legislation was the Baby M282 case in New Jersey. Like Baby Cotton, 
Baby M involved compensated traditional surrogacy, but unlike in Baby 
Cotton, the surrogate in Baby M had a change of heart and sought 
custody of the child shortly after giving birth in 1986.283 In 1987, a New 
Jersey trial court held the surrogacy contract enforceable, awarded 
custody to the intended father—who was also the genetic father—
terminated the surrogate’s parental rights, and granted the intended 
mother’s petition to adopt the child.284 But in 1988, New Jersey’s 
Supreme Court reversed the decision, declaring the surrogacy contract to 
be unenforceable as contrary to public policy, and declaring the intended 
father and the surrogate to be the legal parents of the child.285 It refused 
to terminate the surrogate’s parental rights, although it awarded custody 
to the intended father and visitation to the surrogate.286 
Like the issue of same-sex marriage in the last decade, the Baby M 
case was highly publicized.287 Both while it was winding its way 
through the New Jersey courts and in its aftermath, several state 
legislatures stepped in and enacted laws prohibiting surrogacy, or at least 
making surrogacy contracts unenforceable. Louisiana became the first 
state in the nation to do so,288 enacting in 1987 a law declaring surrogacy 
CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Extraordinary Sess.)). 
280. See Proclamation, Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984, 67 VICT. GOV’T GAZETTE 
3011, 3011–12 (Aug. 6, 1986). 
281. See Proclamation of Commencement, Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984, G16 VICT. 
GOV’T GAZETTE 1053, 1123 (May 4, 1988); Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 269, at 20–21. 
282. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
283. Id. at 1236–37. 
284. See id. at 1237–38; In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987). 
285. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227. 
286. See id. When Baby M herself reached the age of majority, she successfully moved to have 
the surrogate’s parental rights terminated and the intended mother’s adoption petition approved. See 
Jennifer Weiss, Now It’s Melissa’s Time, NEW JERSEY MONTHLY MAG. (Mar. 2007), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070526004403/http://www.njmonthly.com/issues/2007/03-
Mar/babym.htm.  
287. See, e.g., Barbara Kantrowitz et al., Who Keeps ‘Baby M’?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 1987, at 
44; Mary Shaughnessy, All For Love of a Baby, PEOPLE, Mar. 23, 1987, at 50. 
288. See Linda S. Anderson, Legislative Oppression: Restricting Gestational Surrogacy to 
Married Couples Is an Attempt to Legislate Morality, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 611, 623 n.64 (2013); 
Robert D. Arenstein, Is Surrogacy Against Public Policy? The Answer Is Yes, 18 SETON HALL L. 
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contracts unenforceable, but not imposing any civil or criminal penalties 
for entering into such contracts.289 It was quickly followed in 1988 and 
1989 by several other state laws declaring surrogacy contracts to be 
unenforceable,290 including Nebraska291 Indiana,292 North Dakota,293 and 
Arizona.294 
In the wake of Baby M, several other states went further, not merely 
declaring such contracts unenforceable but imposing criminal penalties 
on those who entered into and/or those who helped to facilitate 
surrogacy agreements. The year Baby M was decided, Florida295 and 
Michigan296 enacted statutes criminalizing both entering into and serving 
as an intermediary for surrogacy agreements in terms that were broad 
enough to encompass traditional as well as gestational surrogacy, while 
that same year Kentucky enacted a similar law that only encompassed 
traditional surrogacy.297 In 1989, Utah298 and Washington State299 
REV. 831, 832 (1988); Robert L. Geltzer et al., National Conference on Birth, Death, and Law, 29 
JURIMETRICS J. 403, 416 n.49 (1989). 
289. See Act of July 9, 1987, No. 583, 1987 La. Acts 1433 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9:2713 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.)).  
290. In tracing this early history, I am indebted to the then-contemporary research found in 
MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN ISSUES 157–69 (expanded 
ed. 1990) and in Arenstein, supra note 288, at 832. 
291. See Act of Feb. 10, 1988, No. 674, § 1, 1988 Neb. Laws 572 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 25-21,200 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.)). 
292. See Act of Mar. 5, 1988, No. 175, 1988 Ind. Acts 2050; Act of July 1, 1997, No. 1, 1997 Ind. 
Acts 255 (codified at IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-20-1-1 to 31-20-1-2 (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. 
Sess. & 2d Technical Sess. 2014)). 
293. See Assisted Conception Act, ch. 184, § 5, 1989 N.D. Laws 561, 562 (codified at N.D. 
CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-18-05 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.)). 
294. See Act of Apr. 28, 1989, ch.114, 1989 Ariz. Sess. Laws 393 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 25-218 (Westlaw through 2d Reg. & Special Sess. 2014)). 
295. See Act of July 1, 1988, ch. 88-143, 1988 Fla. Laws 749 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 63.212(1)(i), (6) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.)). The penalty for violating the 
statute is up to five years in prison. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(3)(d) (West, Westlaw through 
2014 Sp. “A” Sess.). 
296. See Act of June 27, 1988, No. 199, 1988 Mich. Pub. Acts 493 (codified at MICH. COMP. 
LAW ANN. § 722.859 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. Act 282)). The penalty for violating 
the statute was up to one year in prison and a $10,000 fine for the contracting parties and up to five 
years in prison and a $50,000 fine for third parties helping to arrange such agreements. See id. 
297. See Act of Mar. 11, 1988, ch. 52, § 1, 1988 Ky. Acts 193, 193–94 (codified at KY. REV. ST. 
ANN. § 199.590 (West, Westlaw through 2014 legislation)). The penalty for violating the statute is 
up to $2,000 and six months in prison, and provides that “[e]ach day such violation continues shall 
constitute a separate offense.” See KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 199.990(2) (West, Westlaw through 2014 
legislation). The Kentucky law was preceded by a case holding that traditional surrogacy 
arrangements do not violate state law prohibiting the sale of children. See Surrogate Parenting 
Associates, Inc. v. Com. ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986). 
298. See Prohibition of Surrogate Parenthood Contracts, ch. 140, § 1, 1989 Utah Laws 333, 333 
 
                                                     
 
13 - Nicolas_Final for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/16/20146:32 PM 
2014] STRADDLING THE COLUMBIA 1287 
enacted statutes criminalizing both entering into and serving as an 
intermediary for surrogacy agreements in terms that were broad enough 
to encompass traditional as well as gestational surrogacy. In 1990, New 
Hampshire enacted a law facilitating surrogacy, but it included a 
provision imposing criminal penalties on intermediaries who earned a 
fee for facilitating surrogacy agreements.300 In 1992, New York enacted 
a law imposing a civil penalty on those entering into compensated 
surrogacy contracts of either sort and imposing civil and criminal 
penalties on intermediaries.301 In 1993, Washington, D.C. enacted a 
statute that imposed criminal penalties on those entering into or 
facilitating surrogacy agreements of any sort: traditional or gestational, 
compensated or uncompensated.302 
Around this same period, the federal government briefly flirted with 
the possibility of prohibiting surrogacy on a nationwide basis. Between 
1987 and 1989, a series of bills were introduced that would impose 
federal criminal penalties for those entering into and/or those brokering 
surrogacy agreements, but none progressed in Congress.303 No bills on 
(codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.)). Violations of 
the statute were classified as a Class A misdemeanor. See id. The legislation had a sunset provision 
of July 1, 1991 to allow a legislative committee to study the issue further, but the sunset provision 
was repealed before it could kick in. See Removal of Sunset Date from Surrogate Parenthood Law, 
ch. 116, § 1, 1991 Utah Laws 413, 413 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204). 
299. See Act of May 13, 1989, ch. 404, 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 2178 (codified at WASH. REV. 
CODE §§ 26.26.230–26.26.250 (2012)). Violations of the statute are treated as a gross misdemeanor 
punishable by up to 364 days in prison and a fine of up to $5,000. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.020 
(2012). The legislative history of the Washington law makes clear that it was a reaction to the Baby 
M case. See Substitute S.B. 5071, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1989), reprinted in FINAL 
LEGISLATIVE REPORT, 51ST WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE, 1989 REGULAR, FIRST AND 
SECOND SPECIAL SESSIONS 183 (1989); Jim Simon, Surrogate-Motherhood Ban Packs Hearing in 
Senate, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 20, 1989, at E1. 
300. See Act of Apr. 10, 1990, ch. 87, 1990 N.H. Laws 117 (codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 168-B:16, 168-B:30 (1990)). 
301. See Act of July 17, 1992, ch. 308, 1992 N.Y. Laws 2943 (codified at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 
§ 123 (McKinney, Westlaw through 2014 legislation)). The statute imposed a $500 civil penalty on 
those entering into surrogacy agreements, a $10,000 civil penalty for the first conviction of a third 
party facilitating such agreements, and criminal punishment for subsequent convictions of third 
party facilitators. See id. The New York statute was preceded by a handful of court decisions 
holding that traditional surrogacy agreements run afoul of law prohibiting the sale of children. See 
Anonymous v. Anonymous, No. P–8572/91, 1991 WL 228555 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Oct. 1, 1991); In re 
Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990). But see In re Adoption of Baby Girl 
L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986).  
302. See Surrogate Parenting Contracts Act of 1992, 40 D.C. Reg. 582 (Jan. 4, 1993) (codified at 
D.C. CODE §§ 16-401 to 16-402 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 1, 2014)). Violations of the statute 
are punishable by up to one year in prison and a $10,000 fine. See id. 
303. See Commercialized Childbearing Act of 1989, H.R. 1188, 101st Cong. (1989); Anti-
Surrogate Mother Act of 1989, H.R. 576, 101st Cong. (1989); Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 
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the issue have been introduced in Congress since 1989. 
Following this spurt of legislative activity in the years immediately 
following Baby M, states stopped enacting laws criminalizing surrogacy 
and instead began enacting laws designed to facilitate surrogacy 
arrangements, the details of which were discussed in Part I of this 
Article. Since 1993, only one state has enacted a law prohibiting or 
criminalizing any aspect of surrogacy. In 2010, Virginia enacted a law 
that, while generally facilitating surrogacy arrangements, imposed 
criminal penalties on intermediaries who earn a fee for facilitating 
surrogacy agreements.304 Florida effectively decriminalized 
compensated surrogacy by enacting laws in 1993305 and 2003306 
providing for gestational and traditional surrogates, respectively, to be 
compensated for “living expenses,” with that term being generously 
construed.307 In 2005, Utah repealed its criminal penalties for surrogacy 
and replaced them with a statutory scheme to facilitate surrogacy 
arrangements.308 In 2014, New Hampshire repealed its law imposing 
criminal penalties on intermediaries who earned a fee for facilitating 
surrogacy agreements.309 In the last several years, serious efforts to 
repeal the prohibitory laws in New York,310 Washington State,311 and 
Washington, D.C.312 have been mounted, while laws introduced in 
Kansas313 and Louisiana314 that would have criminalized surrogacy 
1989, H.R. 275, 101st Cong. (1989); Anti-Surrogate Mother Act of 1987, H.R. 3264, 100th Cong. 
(1987); Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1987, H.R. 2433, 100th Cong. (1987). See generally FIELD, 
supra note 290, at 155–56. 
304. See Act of Apr. 13, 2010, ch. 712, 2010 Va. Acts 1291 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
165 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. & 2014 Special Sess.)). In addition, while not 
involving the enactment of new laws by state legislatures, Attorneys General in Maryland and 
Oklahoma opined that compensated traditional surrogacy agreements violate state laws prohibiting 
the sale of children. See 85 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 348 (2000); 83 Okla. Op. Att’y Gen. 162 (1983). 
305. See Act of May 15, 1993, ch. 93-237, 1993 Fla. Laws 2405 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 742.15 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.)). 
306. See Act of May 30, 2003, ch. 2003-58, 2003 Fla. Laws 520 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 63.213 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.)). 
307. See, e.g., Intended Parents & Parents Via Surrogacy: IP in Florida—”No Compensation”?, 
supra note 41 (Florida surrogates in online discussion board describing reasonable living expenses 
as including rent or mortgage payments, utility bills, and the like); Gestational Surrogacy Price List 
(2014), supra note 41 (Florida surrogacy agency website quantifying reasonable living expenses as 
ranging between $10,000 and $30,000). 
308. See Uniform Parentage Act, ch. 150, § 100, 2005 Utah Laws 1014, 1034. 
309. See Act of July 21, 2014, ch. 248, 2014 N.H. Laws C. 248 (S.B. 353). 
310. See S. 4617, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013). 
311. See H.R. 1267, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011). 
312. See Legis. B. 20-32 (D.C. 2013). 
313. See S. 302, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2014); Amy Hawley, Lawmakers Decide on 
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under some or all circumstances failed to become law. 
Taking all of these developments into account, today only three U.S. 
jurisdictions—Michigan, Washington, and Washington, D.C.—impose 
criminal penalties on those entering into compensated gestational as well 
as traditional surrogacy arrangements. Three other states, Kentucky, by 
an explicit statute, and Maryland and Oklahoma, by Attorney General 
interpretation, impose criminal penalties only on those entering into 
compensated traditional surrogacy arrangements. One other state, New 
York, imposes only civil penalties on those entering into surrogacy 
agreements. Historically, only two other states, Florida and Utah, have 
ever imposed any sort of penalty for entering into compensated 
surrogacy arrangements of any sort. Moreover, in the last few years, 
serious efforts have been mounted to repeal the restrictive laws still in 
place in Washington, Washington, D.C., and New York.315 
Moreover, to the extent that some of these laws encompass 
gestational surrogacy, it probably was not their intended target. The first 
reported case of successful gestational surrogacy was in 1985,316 and by 
1988—when the Baby M case was decided—there had only been a total 
of three births to gestational surrogates in the United States.317 Thus, 
when these laws were being considered, gestational surrogacy was still 
in its infancy and legislators may not have been focused on the 
distinctions between traditional and gestational surrogacy. 
This brief spurt of anti-surrogacy legislative activity was the very sort 
of “short-run departure[] . . . brought about by temporary majorities who 
are insufficiently sensitive to the claims of history”318 that the 
substantive component of the Due Process Clause was designed to 
protect. Just as with the prohibitions on same-sex marriage in modern 
times, the public reaction to something they were unfamiliar with 
Surrogacy Bill, KSHB KAN. CITY, http://www.kshb.com/news/local-news/lawmakers-decide-on-
surrogacy-bill (last visited June 17, 2014). 
314. See H.R. 187, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2014); Letter from Bobby Jindal, Governor of La., 
to Alfred Speer, Clerk of the H.R. (May 30, 2014), available at http://legis.la.gov/Legis/ 
ViewDocument.aspx?d=911932 (notifying Mr. Speer of his veto of H.R. 187). 
315. See supra notes 310–312. 
316. See FAITH MERINO, GLOBAL ISSUES: ADOPTION AND SURROGATE PREGNANCY 38 (2010). 
317. See Tom Paulson, ‘Host Womb’ Babies Born in Tacoma—Woman Gives Birth to Her Own 
Nephews After Embryo Transfer, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 15, 1988, at A1. 
318. Sunstein, supra note 166, at 1163; accord Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 718 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (Norris, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Sunstein, supra note 166, at 1163); 
Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 377 n.12 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (Anderson, J., dissenting) (citing 
Sunstein, supra note 166, at 1171); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 342 (D.C. 1993) 
(Ferren, A.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Sunstein, supra note 165, at 1163). 
 
                                                     
13 - Nicolas_Final for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/16/2014 6:32 PM 
1290 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:1235 
resulted in knee-jerk reactive legislation from politicians across the 
political spectrum. Thus, the bills in Congress that would have 
criminalized surrogacy on a nationwide basis had a range of cosponsors 
from across the political spectrum, from the very conservative Robert K. 
Dornan, Henry Hyde, and Newt Gingrich to the very liberal Barbara 
Boxer, Nancy Pelosi, and Marcy Kaptur.319 In New Jersey, when the 
Baby M trial was taking place, a group of feminists that included Betty 
Friedan, Meryl Streep, Carly Simon, Nora Ephron, and Gloria Steinem 
wrote a letter endorsing the surrogate’s custody claim and in opposition 
to compensated surrogacy.320 When New York outlawed surrogacy in 
the wake of the Baby M case, it was a result of a concerted effort 
involving the New York Catholic Conference working with the New 
York Civil Liberties Union and the National Organization for Women.321 
And in Washington State, the anti-surrogacy law garnered support from 
across the political spectrum,322 with self-proclaimed feminists split on 
the issue.323 
Moreover, that surrogacy has taken place for so much of history free 
of any governmental interference,324 and that even at the peak of anti-
surrogacy sentiment only a handful of states enacting legislation 
319. See Commercialized Childbearing Act of 1989, H.R. 1188, 101st Cong. (1989); Anti-
Surrogate Mother Act of 1989, H.R. 576, 101st Cong. (1989); Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 
1989, H.R. 275, 101st Cong. (1989); Anti-Surrogate Mother Act of 1987, H.R. 3264, 100th Cong. 
(1987); Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1987, H.R. 2433, 100th Cong. (1987). See generally FIELD, 
supra note 290, at 155–56. 
320. See Iver Peterson, Fitness Test for Baby’s Mother Unfair, Feminists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
20, 1987, at B1. 
321. See Anemona Hartocollis, And Surrogacy Makes 3, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2014, at E1; 
SUSAN MARKENS, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD AND THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION 139–70 
(2007). 
322. See Bill Banning Paid Child-Bearing Deals Advances, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 9, 1989, at B11 
(noting support of anti-surrogacy laws by both Democrats and Republicans); Simon, supra note 
299, at E1 (noting support of anti-surrogacy laws by both Democrats and Republicans). 
323. See Simon, supra note 299, at E1. 
324. A few lower court decisions have held that it is not enough for there to be a history of non-
interference with the right, but instead there must be a history of affirmative protection of the right 
at issue; in other words, positive statutes declaring the right at issue to be a protected one. See 
Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 2004); Lofton v. Sec’y of 
Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 816 n.15 (11th Cir. 2004). But as most lower 
courts have correctly noted, the Supreme Court’s decisions do not require a showing of a history of 
affirmative protection of the right at issue, and point out that if this were in fact a requirement, the 
contraception and abortion cases would have been decided differently since there was no history of 
statutes affirmatively protecting those rights. See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 53–54 (1st Cir. 2008); 
Williams, 378 F.3d at 1257–58 (Barkett, J., dissenting); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & 
Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1308–09 & 1309 n.49 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
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restricting surrogacy, makes its claim to being a practice deeply rooted 
in history and tradition far more compelling than virtually any other 
claimed fundamental right that the Court has considered. Thus, for 
example, in Roe, the Court found that the right to abortion was deeply 
rooted in history and tradition despite the fact that states began to restrict 
the right as early as 1821; that by the time the Fourteenth Amendment 
was ratified, thirty-six states and territories had enacted laws restricting 
the right; and that in the 1950s a large majority of states prohibited 
abortion in most instances.325 In finding the right to procure an abortion 
to be a protected one, the Roe Court focused on the fact that the right 
was freely exercised at common law at the time the Constitution was 
adopted and early in the nineteenth century.326 In contrast, the Bowers 
Court, in rejecting the claimed right, focused on the fact that sodomy 
was criminalized at common law and by all of the original colonies, by 
nearly all of the states at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified, by all fifty states until 1961, and by about half of the states at 
the time of the decision.327 Similarly, in Glucksberg, in rejecting the 
claimed right, the Court focused on the fact that suicide and assisted 
suicide were criminalized at common law, by the original colonies, by a 
majority of the states at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified, and by nearly all states at the time of the decision.328 Surrogacy, 
having been unregulated until the late 1980s and then only briefly and by 
a handful of states, makes the arguments for treating it as a right deeply 
rooted in history and tradition indisputable given these guideposts.329 
Moreover, as indicated above, in Lawrence, the Court held that even 
if laws are on the books, their non-enforcement is a relevant 
consideration, since non-enforcement is tantamount to non-interference. 
Yet as Justice Scalia noted, there was still some enforcement of sodomy 
laws historically, with his research turning up “203 prosecutions for 
consensual, adult homosexual sodomy reported in the West Reporting 
system and official state reporters from the years 1880–1995” and 
“records of 20 sodomy prosecutions and 4 executions during the colonial 
325. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 139–40 (1973); id. at 174–76 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
326. See id. at 140. 
327. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192–94 (1986). 
328. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–16 (1997). 
329. Cf. Latta v. Otter, No. 1:13–cv–0482, 2014 WL 1909999, at *13 (D. Idaho May 13, 2014), 
aff’d, 2014 WL 4977682 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014) (noting, in a case involving a challenge to a law 
prohibiting same-sex marriage, that “[f]ar from a uniform pattern of laws rejecting the practice 
[found in Glucksberg], a fast-growing number of states now recognize that same-sex and opposite-
sex marriages are equal”). 
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period.”330 In contrast, there is no record whatsoever of anyone in the 
United States ever being prosecuted, let alone convicted, for entering 
into a surrogacy arrangement. Thus, any weight to be accorded to even 
this brief period of interference with the right to enter into surrogacy 
arrangements is negated by the non-enforcement of these laws. 
In addition, Lawrence indicated that consideration should also be 
given to contemporary developments that demonstrate an “emerging 
awareness” that a particular right is worthy of protection.331 In this 
regard, one could argue that actual decriminalization of surrogacy in 
some states, coupled with efforts to decriminalize in others, and the 
various laws enacted to facilitate surrogacy arrangements in states that 
previously had no law on the subject, collectively demonstrate an 
“emerging awareness” that surrogacy is a protected right. 
Finally, for purposes of recognizing surrogacy as a fundamental right, 
it is not necessary to distinguish between compensated and 
uncompensated surrogacy. While it is true that in Lawrence, the Court 
distinguished between the uncompensated sexual activity at issue in the 
case before it and the compensated sexual activity where prostitution is 
involved, noting that the case before it “does not 
involve . . . prostitution,”332 that does not mean that activities that 
involve compensation can never fall within the scope of a fundamental 
right. After all, the rights to an abortion or to contraception do not lose 
their protected status merely because the person seeking to exercise that 
right has to pay a third party, such as a doctor or a pharmacist, to procure 
the abortion or to obtain the contraception.333 Rather, the limiting 
proviso in Lawrence, which also referred to a variety of other things that 
the case did not involve, including minors, coercion, or legal recognition 
of a relationship,334 was designed to cabin the scope of Lawrence itself 
and, perhaps, to respond to a Pandora’s Box that Justice Scalia claimed 
was opened by the decision.335 Indeed, prostitution stands in stark 
330. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 597 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
331. Id. at 571–72. 
332. See id. at 578. 
333. See, e.g., Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Alabama, 378 F.2d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004) (“For 
purposes of constitutional analysis, restrictions on the ability to purchase an item are tantamount to 
restrictions on the use of that item. . . . [P]rohibitions on the sale of contraceptives have been 
analyzed as burdens on the use of contraceptives. . . . Because a prohibition on the distribution of 
sexual devices would burden an individual’s ability to use the devices, our analysis must be framed 
not simply in terms of whether the Constitution protects a right to sell and buy sexual devices, but 
whether it protects a right to use such devices.” (emphasis in original)). 
334. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
335. See id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult 
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contrast to surrogacy—compensated or not—in that the former has a 
long history of being criminalized in the United States while the latter 
does not. Prostitution also stands in stark contrast to consensual sodomy 
in that prostitution laws have been consistently enforced and have 
remained in force while sodomy laws have been steadily repealed over 
time and even when on the books have not been enforced. This is not to 
say that the distinction between compensated and uncompensated 
surrogacy is irrelevant. Instead, the presence or absence of 
compensation, as I discuss in the next section, is pertinent in assessing 
the governmental objectives and the means for accomplishing them 
when applying strict scrutiny to such laws. 
In sum, no matter which of the various approaches to framing and 
recognizing fundamental rights is employed, laws prohibiting or 
restricting access to surrogacy infringe upon a fundamental right 
protected substantively by the Due Process Clause. Yet, to be clear, I am 
not contending that all of the restrictive laws discussed in Part I of this 
Article fall within the scope of that right. Rather, only those laws that 
actually prohibit parties from entering into surrogacy agreements—such 
as those laws that impose criminal penalties on parties entering into 
them—or those laws designed to discourage parties from proceeding 
with surrogacy arrangements—such as the FDA regulations that seek to 
deter women from serving as surrogates to gay men336—can be said to 
infringe upon the broader right to procreate or the narrower right to 
procreate through the assistance of a surrogate. In contrast, those laws 
that merely declare such agreements to be unenforceable, I would argue, 
are outside the scope of these two fundamental rights. This is because 
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects only 
“negative liberties,” meaning that it only requires that the government 
leave people alone; it does not require the government to affirmatively 
incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise 
sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of 
these laws is called into question by today’s decision.”). 
336. The mere fact that a law does not prohibit the exercise of a fundamental right, but instead 
seeks to make it more difficult or burdensome to exercise that right, does not insulate it from 
constitutional attack. Thus, for example, in the abortion context, the Court has held that “[a]n undue 
burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place 
substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.” 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (emphasis added). In the same-
sex marriage context, one court has noted that if laws like the Defense of Marriage Act are designed 
to discourage same-sex couples from having children by making it less desirable, harder, or more 
expensive to do so, they are subject to challenge on the ground that they infringe upon the 
fundamental right to procreate. See Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 341 (D. 
Conn. 2012). 
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act.337 Thus, while challenges to laws criminalizing surrogacy and the 
FDA regulations further the negative liberty of procreating without 
governmental interference, challenges to the laws declaring surrogacy 
contracts to be unenforceable seek to get the government to affirmatively 
act to enforce such agreements, which would not be consistent with the 
history of substantive due process.338 Those laws that present barriers to 
establishing parentage are somewhat more complex and are treated 
separately in Part III of this Article. 
2. Application of Strict Scrutiny 
To conclude that surrogacy is either a free-standing fundamental right 
or a subset of the fundamental right to procreate is not the end of the 
analysis. As the handful of courts to consider the issue have correctly 
noted, this does not mean that all laws regarding surrogacy are thereby 
declared unconstitutional; rather, it means that they must be subjected to 
strict scrutiny,339 meaning that the law must be narrowly tailored to 
further a compelling governmental interest.340 
With respect to laws criminalizing or otherwise prohibiting 
compensated surrogacy, courts have identified four arguably compelling 
337. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194–99 (1989); 
Sandage v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Vanderburgh Cnty., 548 F.3d 595, 596–97 (7th Cir. 2008); Lofton v. 
Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815, 817 (11th Cir. 2004); Cain, supra 
note 166, at 37–40.  
338. This is not to say that the laws declaring surrogacy contracts unenforceable are not subject to 
constitutional challenge on some other ground. For example, as indicated in Part I, some of the laws 
render such agreements enforceable only when entered into by an opposite-sex couple, not when 
entered into by a same-sex couple. Such laws discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, and are 
thus subject to a class-based equal protection challenge using the as-yet undetermined “heightened” 
level of scrutiny that the Court appears to apply to such classifications. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
580 (O’Connor, J., concurring); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 479–84 
(9th Cir. 2014). Arguments that same-sex parents are inferior to opposite-sex ones have been 
rejected in recent litigation regarding same-sex marriage, and thus would likely be rejected as a 
basis for justifying such laws. See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 383 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, Nos. 6:13–cv–0184 & 6:13–cv–02256–MC, 
2014 WL 2054264, at *12 (D. Or. May 19, 2014); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 651, 653 
(W.D. Tex. 2014); Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 319 (D. Conn. 2012). 
339. See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484, 486 (Mich. App. 1992). 
340. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). Although the Court has 
applied a lower level of scrutiny to laws restricting the right to an abortion, and although, as 
discussed above, Lawrence may be ushering a new mid-tier level of scrutiny for some types of 
rights protected substantively by the Due Process Clause, the default rule remains, as articulated in 
Glucksberg, that strict scrutiny applies to infringements upon fundamental rights. In any event, the 
Court’s application of intermediate scrutiny in recent years is not significantly different from strict 
scrutiny. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); id. at 570–74, 596 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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governmental interests: first, protecting women—particularly lower-
income women—from exploitation;341 second, preventing children from 
becoming mere commodities;342 third, preventing future emotional harm 
to children who later learn they were born as the result of a commercial 
transaction;343 and fourth, avoiding the emotional disruption to a 
surrogate that results from her being separated from the child she gives 
birth to.344 
To be sure, all of these interests sound like perfectly reasonable ones 
for the government to be concerned about, and one could easily 
speculate that, at least in some instances, compensated surrogacy might 
create some of the above enumerated risks. And if one were applying 
traditional rational basis review, such “rational speculation unsupported 
by evidence or empirical data” would suffice.345 Yet where, as here, 
strict scrutiny is involved, reasoned speculation does not suffice; there 
must be evidence that the law will actually further these interests.346 Yet 
as some courts have noted, there is no empirical evidence showing that 
surrogacy arrangements result in the exploitation of poor women or the 
commodification of children.347 
Moreover, even if prohibiting surrogacy will, in some instances, 
further these interests, a ban on all surrogacy arrangements, regardless of 
the presence or absence of these dangers, is too over-inclusive to satisfy 
341. See Doe, 487 N.W.2d at 487. 
342. See Soos v. Superior Court of Maricopa, 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (Gerber, 
J., specially concurring); Doe, 487 N.W.2d at 486–87. 
343. See Doe, 487 N.W.2d at 487. 
344. See Soos, 897 P.2d at 1361 (Gerber, J., specially concurring). 
345. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).  
346. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227–28 (1984); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 
1218–19, 1222–23 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014). Similarly, in the abortion 
context, in applying the undue burden test, several courts have held that when an abortion restriction 
is justified on the ground of furthering maternal health, the strength of those grounds must be 
assessed—by resort to evidence—and balanced against the burden on women seeking an abortion. 
See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 911–14 (9th Cir. 2014); Planned 
Parenthood of Wis. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 798 (7th Cir. 2013). But see Planned Parenthood 
of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 590, 593–96 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(holding that the strength of the regulation’s rationale plays no role in the undue burden analysis); 
Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc., 738 F.3d at 799–800 (Manion, J., concurring in part and in the 
judgment) (same). 
347. See J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1288–89 (D. Utah 2002); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 
P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. 1993). This is not to say that a woman’s financial state in no way impacts her 
decision to serve as a surrogate, but as the Calvert Court explained, there is “no proof that surrogacy 
contracts exploit poor women to any greater degree than economic necessity in general exploits 
them by inducing them to accept lower-paid or otherwise undesirable employment.” Calvert, 851 
P.2d at 785. 
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strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring requirement. Thus, for example, if one 
is concerned about the risk that poor women might be exploited by 
surrogacy arrangements, there are more fine-tuned ways short of an 
outright ban on compensated surrogacy to further that interest. One such 
alternative would be court preapproval of surrogacy contracts in which 
the judge can make an individualized determination about the possibility 
of exploitation.348 This distinction between a blunt and a fine-tuned 
approach is akin to the way the Court has applied strict scrutiny in its 
race-based affirmative action cases and its cases involving the 
application of presumptions regarding parental fitness. The Court has 
held that race-based affirmative action grounded in diversity requires an 
individualized assessment of each applicant rather than blunt tools such 
as quotas,349 and that a state cannot apply a blunt presumption—such as 
that unwed fathers are presumed to be unfit to raise their children—to 
terminate parental custody rights, but must instead hold an 
individualized hearing on parental fitness.350 
Moreover, laws that permit uncompensated surrogacy while 
prohibiting compensated surrogacy do not necessarily avoid the risk of 
exploitation. After all, when one family member is in need of the 
assistance of a surrogate, family pressure could easily be placed on a 
female family member in a position to serve as their uncompensated 
surrogate. In contrast, an unrelated surrogate in an arm’s length 
relationship with intended parents is in a much better position to walk 
away from a situation that she feels uncomfortable about.351 
If one is concerned about the commodification of children and the 
emotional harms that surrogacy could cause such children in the future, 
one can enact restrictions calculated to further that specific goal, such as 
laws that prohibit variable compensation for an egg donor’s traits or that 
impose caps on compensation for egg donors and surrogates, or laws that 
348. See J.R., 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 n.34. 
349. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003). 
350. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646–47, 654–58 (1972). In litigation regarding the 
right to same-sex marriage and parenting, lower courts have relied on Stanley for the proposition 
that where heightened scrutiny is involved, courts cannot rely on broad generalizations about the 
fitness of gays and lesbians to parent. See Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1225–26 (10th Cir. 
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 651, 654 (W.D. 
Tex. 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 479 (E.D. Va. 2014); In re Adoption of Doe, 
2008 WL 5070056, at *32–*33 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008); Florida Dep’t of Health & 
Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1227–29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), approved in 
part, quashed in part, 656 So. 2d 902 (1995). 
351. See, e.g., Tim Barlass, When Altruistic Surrogacy Goes Wrong, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD 
(Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/national/when-altruistic-surrogacy-goes-wrong-20140809-
101bo5.html. 
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prohibit sex-selective embryo implantation. If one is concerned about the 
emotional harm to a surrogate of being separated from the child, 
mandatory psychological screening of the sort present in some of the 
statutes examined in Part I is a more fine-tuned way to minimize those 
risks. Additionally, a state could distinguish between traditional and 
gestational surrogacy, for the risks of such harm seem far more acute for 
the former than the latter. 
For similar reasons, the FDA regulations declaring any man who has 
had sex with another man in the past five years to be an ineligible donor 
are too blunt a tool to survive strict scrutiny. The governmental 
interest—preventing women from contracting HIV and other sexually 
transmitted diseases—is easily a compelling one. Yet there are far more 
fine-tuned ways to further this objective, such as requiring the donor’s 
semen sample to be frozen and testing the donor for HIV and other 
sexually transmitted diseases several months later, when the risk of a 
false negative is no longer a realistic risk.352 Indeed, the FDA 
regulations, targeted against a specific group, gay men, raise in a very 
real way the eugenics concerns that the Skinner Court invoked for 
applying strict scrutiny to laws infringing upon the right to procreate.353 
Moreover, for two additional reasons, those anti-surrogacy statutes 
imposing criminal liability on any actor are particularly vulnerable when 
strict scrutiny is applied. First, in virtually every major case in the 
Court’s fundamental rights line of cases354—as well as in the Court’s 
interracial marriage and cohabitation cases355—the Court struck down 
laws that imposed criminal sanctions. In these cases the Court, or at least 
individual Justices, often noted that the criminal nature of the laws made 
352. See John G. Culhane, Bad Science, Worse Policy: The Exclusion of Gay Males from Donor 
Pools, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 129, 137–44 (2005). 
353. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Luke A. Boso, 
Comment, The Unjust Exclusion of Gay Sperm Donors: Litigation Strategies to End Discrimination 
in the Gene Pool, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 843, 872–73 (2008); Alissa Stockage, Note, Regulating 
Multiple Birth Pregnancies: Comparing the United Kingdom’s Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme 
with the United States’ Progressive, Intimate Decision-Making Approach, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 
559, 583 (2010). 
354. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); 
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 
(1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner, 316 U.S. 535; Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
355. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
Although the portions of these two decisions in which the Court made note of the laws’ criminal 
sanctions were formally decided on equal protection grounds, they were subsequently characterized 
by the Court as being part of the Court’s fundamental rights line of cases. 
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them particularly vulnerable.356 Indeed, in recent challenges to laws 
prohibiting same-sex marriage or adoption, or laws prohibiting gays 
from serving in the military, lower court judges have noted the civil 
nature of these laws in distinguishing them from the Court’s 
fundamental rights cases.357 
Second, as indicated above, while some of the anti-surrogacy laws 
impose criminal liability on intermediaries who help facilitate surrogacy 
contracts, others go further and impose criminal liability on those 
entering into the surrogacy contract; in other words, the surrogate and 
the intended parents. Drawing an analogy to the abortion context, in 
which the Court applies not strict scrutiny but the more relaxed “undue 
burden” standard, this would be the equivalent of imposing criminal 
liability not only on the doctor who performs an outlawed abortion, but 
also on the pregnant woman who has the abortion performed on her. Yet, 
neither the Supreme Court nor any lower court has ever upheld an 
abortion law that imposed criminal liability on the woman seeking an 
abortion, but only on third parties who perform or facilitate abortions. 
Indeed, a lower court recently struck down an abortion law for its 
unprecedented criminalization of the conduct of the woman procuring 
the abortion.358 
In sum, legislatures are not prohibited from enacting sensible 
regulatory schemes in an effort to protect would-be surrogates and the 
children born to them. But they cannot further these interests by using 
the blunt tool of prohibition, particularly when coupled with criminal 
sanctions. Rather, they must enact fine-tuned and highly individualized 
regulations designed to minimize infringing upon the fundamental right 
to procreate. 
III. THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH LEGAL PARENTAGE OF 
CHILDREN BORN VIA SURROGACY 
Even in states that have not enacted laws prohibiting people from 
entering into surrogacy contracts, there remain other potential barriers to 
356. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575–76 (2003); id. at 581–82 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Loving, 
388 U.S. at 11 (1967); id. at 13 (Stewart, J., concurring); McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192 (1964); id. at 
198 (Stewart, J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
357. See Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 548 F.3d 1264, 1270 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 
817 (11th Cir. 2004); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 16–18 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King 
Cnty., 158 Wash. 2d 1, 51–52, 138 P.3d 963, 990 (Wash. 2006). 
358. See McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1010–14 (9th Cir. 2012); McCormack v. 
Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1144–45 (D. Idaho 2013). 
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becoming a parent via surrogacy. While these states do not stand in the 
way of intended parents’ right to procreate—if by procreation one 
literally means creating human life using your genetic material—they do 
stand in the way of the intended parents’ ability to establish legal 
parentage of the children produced as a result of surrogacy. In some 
states, this has been accomplished by laws specifically declaring that a 
surrogate mother is the legal mother of any child born to her and that her 
husband—if she is married—is the legal father.359 Other statutory 
schemes, while not specific to surrogacy, provide that maternity is 
established by giving birth to a child and that a woman’s husband, if the 
woman is married, is presumed to be the legal father.360 Moreover, in 
some of these statutory regimes, these presumptions can only be 
challenged—if at all—by the woman, her husband, and perhaps the child 
itself, not by third persons.361 These laws thus stand in the way of 
intended parents establishing legal parentage of children genetically 
related to one or both of them—and not genetically related to the 
surrogate or her husband—either if there is a dispute between the 
intended parents and the surrogate362 or, in some instances, even if the 
surrogate supports the efforts of the intended parents to establish 
parentage.363 
The question thus arises, is there a fundamental right not only to 
procreate via surrogacy, but also to have one’s legal parentage to the 
children born via surrogacy established by the state? There are a number 
of ways to argue such a right. The first is to contend that establishment 
of legal parentage is part and parcel of the fundamental right to 
procreate, and therefore statutory schemes that prevent intended parents 
who are also the genetic parents from establishing legal parentage 
infringe upon that right. The second is to argue that establishment of 
legal parentage is part of a separate fundamental right—the right to care, 
custody, and control of one’s children. And the third is to make a class-
based equal protection argument, either from the standpoint of the 
intended parents or the children born of surrogacy arrangements. I 
consider each of these arguments in turn. 
359. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(B)–(C) (Westlaw through 2d Reg. & Special 
Sess. 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-18-05 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
360. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 184–185 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
361. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.187, 191, 197 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
362. See, e.g., Soos v. Superior Court of Maricopa, 897 P.2d 1356, 1359–61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1994). 
363. See, e.g., J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2002). 
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A. Fundamental Right to Establish Legal Parentage 
A few courts have interpreted the establishment of legal parentage as 
part and parcel of the fundamental right to procreate, and have thus held 
that statutory schemes that prevent intended parents who are also the 
genetic parents from establishing legal parentage infringe upon that 
right.364 
On the one hand, such an interpretation makes sense. The 
fundamental right to procreate would seem to be of little utility if one 
could not have legal parentage, and therefore custody of, the children 
that result from the act of procreation, whether done through natural 
means or via assisted reproduction. Moreover, just as the Court in 
Griswold held that unenumerated rights can be found in the penumbras 
of the Bill of Rights and that these penumbral rights are “necessary in 
making the express guarantees fully meaningful,”365 so too the Court has 
recognized that unenumerated rights themselves have penumbras. Thus, 
for example, in Carey v. Population Services International,366 the Court 
held that the right to use contraceptives recognized in Griswold includes 
a penumbral right to the purchase and sale of the same free of 
governmental interference.367 
There is, however, a problem with such an argument, even if as a 
general matter it is correct to argue that unenumerated rights have 
penumbral extensions. As indicated in Part II, the substantive component 
of the Due Process Clause protects only “negative liberties,” meaning 
that it only requires that the government leave people alone, but does not 
require the government to affirmatively act.368 In a case such as Carey, 
364. Typically, these courts do not cite the right to procreate, standing alone, but rather appear to 
mix the precedents involving the right to procreate with the right to care, custody, and control of 
one’s children. See T.V. v. New York Dep’t of Health, 929 N.Y.S.2d 139, 150–53 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2011); J.R., 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1275–78; Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 766 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 
1994); Soos, 897 P.2d at 1359–61. 
365. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–84 (1965). 
366. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
367. See id. at 687–88; accord Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.2d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir. 
2004) (“For purposes of constitutional analysis, restrictions on the ability to purchase an item are 
tantamount to restrictions on the use of that item. . . . [P]rohibitions on the sale of contraceptives 
have been analyzed as burdens on the use of contraceptives. . . . Because a prohibition on the 
distribution of sexual devices would burden an individual’s ability to use the devices, our analysis 
must be framed not simply in terms of whether the Constitution protects a right to sell and buy 
sexual devices, but whether it protects a right to use such devices.” (emphasis in original)). 
368. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194–99 (1989); 
Sandage v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Vanderburgh Cnty., 548 F.3d 595, 596–97 (7th Cir. 2008); Lofton v. 
Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815, 817 (11th Cir 2004); Cain, supra 
note 166, at 37–40.  
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enforcing both the “core” right at issue—the right to use 
contraceptives—and the penumbral right—the right to purchase and sell 
the same—involve negative liberties in that the government is not being 
asked to affirmatively act, but merely to refrain from interfering with the 
exercise of the underlying rights. In contrast, holding that the 
fundamental right to procreate includes a penumbral right to have the 
government declare the legal parentage of the intended parents is 
requiring the government to affirmatively act, akin to arguing that the 
government must also enforce surrogacy contracts in the first instance. 
In the contraception or abortion contexts, this would be the equivalent of 
holding that those fundamental rights include a penumbral right to have 
the government pay for contraception and abortions, which the Court has 
clearly rejected.369 
A more doctrinally sound way to challenge the constitutionality of 
these statutory schemes on fundamental rights grounds is to invoke the 
related but distinct fundamental right to care, custody, and control of 
one’s children. This long-standing right was first established during the 
Lochner era in a pair of cases that predate Skinner and that have gone on 
to serve as the foundation for most modern substantive due process 
jurisprudence.370 First, in Meyer v. Nebraska,371 the Court declared 
unconstitutional a state law making it a crime to teach any subject prior 
to the eighth grade in any language other than English, holding that the 
Due Process Clause protects the right “to marry, establish a home and 
bring up children,”372 and that the law at issue interfered with this 
right.373 Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,374 the Court 
struck down a state law that required all children between eight and 
sixteen years of age to attend public schools (as contrasted with private 
schools), concluding that “[u]nder the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska,” 
the law “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and 
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their 
369. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 (citing McRae for the more general proposition that “the Due 
Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may 
be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not 
deprive the individual”); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980). 
370. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 761–63 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) 
(providing a historical overview of the development of the Court’s modern substantive due process 
line of cases). 
371. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
372. Id. at 399. 
373. Id. at 402–03. 
374. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 
                                                     
13 - Nicolas_Final for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/16/2014 6:32 PM 
1302 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:1235 
control.”375 In Troxel v. Granville376—a case involving a challenge to a 
Washington State statute that allowed any nonparent third party to 
petition for visitation rights—the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the 
continued vitality of these early precedents. In Troxel, the Court cited 
Meyer and Pierce and held that “[t]he liberty interest at issue in [the] 
case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their 
children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized by this Court.”377 
In its decisions summarizing the rights recognized as fundamental 
under the Due Process Clause, the Court itself has treated the rights to 
procreate and to care, custody, and control of one’s children as 
independent rights.378 Moreover, lower courts considering substantive 
due process challenges to statutory schemes that stand in the way of 
intended parents establishing legal parentage have distinguished the two 
rights from one another,379 and have held that such statutory schemes 
interfere with the right to care, custody, and control of one’s children.380 
The distinction is not merely semantic, but converts what would 
otherwise appear to be a demand that the government affirmatively act 
into a demand for governmental non-interference, which aligns the relief 
sought with the theoretical limitations of substantive due process. Here, 
the underlying fundamental right is the right to care, custody, and 
control of one’s children free of governmental interference. Yet in these 
cases, the government—by enforcing legal presumptions that make the 
surrogate and her husband the child’s legal parents—is interfering with 
the intended parents’ fundamental right to care, custody, and control of 
their children. 
Assuming that it is sound to view this as part of the fundamental right 
to care, custody, and control of one’s children, the application of these 
presumptions would likely fail strict scrutiny for reasons similar to those 
examined in the previous section, specifically, that the presumptions are 
too blunt a tool to further any conceivable governmental interests. In 
justifying the application of these presumptions to deny intended parents 
who are genetically related to children born to a gestational surrogate the 
375. Id. at 534–35. 
376. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
377. Id. at 65. 
378. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (referring in the disjunctive to “[t]he rights 
to conceive and to raise one’s children”); accord Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990). 
379. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253–54 (N.J. 1988). 
380. See D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 335–39 (Fla. 2013); J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 
1268, 1275–78, 1293–98 (D. Utah 2002). 
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ability to establish legal parentage, two governmental interests have 
typically been invoked: first, that surrogacy agreements result in a 
custody decision that may not be in the best interests of the child; and 
second, that such a presumption protects the surrogate’s emotional well-
being by protecting her interest in a relationship with the child.381 Yet 
courts have correctly rejected these justifications, noting that conclusive 
presumptions that the surrogate and her husband are the legal parents—
in lieu of an individual hearing to determine what custody arrangement 
is in the child’s best interest or the impact on a surrogate’s well-being—
fail the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny.382 
There is, however, a serious hurdle to overcome in arguing that the 
fundamental right to care, custody, and control of one’s genetic children 
encompasses a right to establish that parentage in the face of these 
statutory presumptions. The presumption that a woman who gives birth 
to a child is the child’s mother,383 as well as the presumption that her 
husband is the child’s father, have a longstanding historical pedigree at 
common law as well as in historical U.S. practice.384 
Indeed, as indicated in Part II of this Article, the U.S. Supreme Court, 
in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,385 rejected a substantive due process 
challenge, brought by a man purporting to be the natural father of a 
child, to a state law that conclusively presumed a woman’s husband to 
be the father of a child, with only a limited time period for either the 
husband or wife, but not third persons, to use blood tests to challenge the 
presumption.386 In so holding, the Court relied on the longstanding 
historical pedigree of the presumption and the fact that it could not 
historically be challenged by anyone other than the husband or wife (and 
in many cases, not even by them).387 The natural father invoked a series 
of cases that grew out of the Court’s Meyer and Pierce line of cases in 
which the Court held that the natural father of a child born to an unwed 
mother has a right to establish legal parentage to that child.388 In that line 
381. See J.R., 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1284–88, 1284 n.24, 1288 n.34 (D. Utah 2002). 
382. See id. (considering various rationales for such presumptions and demonstrating that such 
presumptions are not narrowly tailored to further those rationales). 
383. See In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 644 (Wis. 2013); D.M.T., 129 So. 3d at 355–56 (Polston, 
C.J., dissenting); In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2009); In re 
C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 728 (Tenn. 2005); Barabas v. Rogers, 868 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 2003). 
384. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124–26 (1989). 
385. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
386. See id. at 124–27. 
387. See id.  
388. See id. at 123, 128–29. 
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of cases, the Court held that by virtue of his biological link to the child, 
such a father has an inchoate right that develops into a full-fledged 
fundamental due process right to care, custody, and control if he takes 
affirmative steps to develop that relationship389 (a line of cases that 
would certainly be directly on point in the situation in which an intended 
genetic father claimed parentage to a child born to an unwed surrogate 
mother). The Court rejected the purported natural father’s reliance on 
this line of cases,390 treating this in effect as a historical gloss on the 
scope of the fundamental right to care, custody, and control of one’s 
children. In other words, because as a matter of historical practice, the 
government has always interfered with the right of natural fathers in this 
circumstance, the right to challenge such laws cannot be said to be a 
fundamental right deeply rooted in history and tradition. 
Michael H. is a potentially insurmountable obstacle in trying to argue 
that intended parents have a fundamental right to establish legal 
parentage. True, the Michael H. case took place in the context of an 
adulterous affair and thus the presumption served its historic purposes in 
promoting marital harmony and the legitimization of children,391 neither 
of which would likely be implicated in the surrogacy context. Yet, while 
that distinction might be relevant had the Court held that the 
fundamental right to care, custody, and control was implicated but that 
the presumption furthered compelling governmental interests, that is not 
what the Court held. Rather, the Court held that the longstanding 
existence of this presumption meant that the right to care, custody, and 
control was not even implicated in the case, thus allowing the 
government to pursue any rational objectives.392 
However, if, as was considered in Part II, Lawrence in fact refined the 
Glucksberg inquiry to permit a consideration not merely of longstanding 
history and tradition, but also more contemporary legal developments, 
there is a strong basis for concluding that in the surrogacy context, there 
is an “emerging awareness” that the intended parents should be able to 
establish their legal parentage. Recall that in Lawrence, the Court 
reasoned that “our laws and traditions in the past half century are of 
most relevance here,” which the Court described as showing “an 
389. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256–62 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 
389, 397 (1979) (decided on equal protection grounds but subsequently recharacterized as due 
process); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254–55 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 
(1961). 
390. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123, 128–29. 
391. See id. at 124–25. 
392. See id. at 129–32. 
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emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult 
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters 
pertaining to sex.”393 The Court also held that “[t]his emerging 
recognition should have been apparent when Bowers was decided.”394 
The Court described this “emerging awareness” as consisting of: (1) the 
1955 Model Penal Code’s recommendation that there be no criminal 
penalties for sexual relations conducted in private; (2) that between that 
point in time and the decision in Bowers, half of the states repealed their 
criminal penalties for consensual sodomy; (3) that states with sodomy 
laws on the books were not enforcing them; and (4) that sodomy laws 
were repealed in the United Kingdom and that the European Court of 
Human Rights declared such laws to violate the European Convention 
on Human Rights.395 
In a variety of ways, contemporary legal developments regarding the 
establishment of legal parentage in the surrogacy context track the 
guideposts identified in Lawrence as constituting an “emerging 
awareness.”396 The 2002 version of the Uniform Parentage Act similarly 
contains provisions designed to deal with the possibility that a child will 
be born to a gestational carrier, and accordingly provides for the 
intended parents, rather than the surrogate and her husband, to be 
recognized as the legal parents of the child.397 At least twenty-five 
percent of the states now have provisions in their parentage statutes 
indicating that where a surrogacy arrangement is involved, the woman 
who gives birth is not the legal mother and her husband is not the legal 
father, but instead the intended parents are the legal parents.398 At least 
an equal number, while not enacting statutory provisions specific to 
393. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–72 (2003). 
394. Id. at 572. 
395. See id. at 571–73. 
396. Id. at 572. 
397. See Uniform Parentage Act, §§ 201, 801–809, 2002 Wash. Sess. Laws 3, 11–12, 68–78 
(2002). 
398. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Extraordinary Sess.); 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(f)(1) (West, Westlaw though 2014 Reg. Sess. ch. 531); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 7-48a (Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-804 (West, Westlaw 
through 2014 ch. 428); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.16(7) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.); 
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 15 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. Act 98-925); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:5, 168-B:7 (West, Westlaw through ch. 330 of 2014 Reg. Sess.); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.670 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. & Special Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 14-18-08 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.753 
(West, Westlaw through 3d Called Sess. 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-807 (West, Westlaw 
through 2014 Gen. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(D) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. & 
2014 Special Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.101(1), (8) (2012). 
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surrogacy, have enacted more general provisions for challenging the 
presumptions of legal maternity399 and paternity400 that are well-suited 
for the surrogacy context, some of which allow third parties to bring the 
contest.401 Thus, the number of states that have done away with the rigid 
common law presumptions has approached at least the fifty percent 
mark, the percentage of states that had repealed their sodomy laws at the 
time of Bowers and that the Lawrence Court indicated made it 
“apparent” that there was an “emerging awareness” that the right was a 
protected one.402 Finally, in 2014, the European Court of Human Rights 
declared that even though France did not need to permit surrogacy 
within the country, France’s refusal to recognize French intended parents 
as the legal parents of children born outside of France to surrogate 
mothers violated the European Convention on Human Rights.403 
In sum, although the ability of intended parents to establish legal 
parentage of children born to a surrogate may not be a component of the 
fundamental right to procreate, it is potentially a component of the 
fundamental right to care, custody, and control of one’s children. 
However, this latter argument is sound only to the extent that Lawrence 
in fact modified the Court’s pre-existing framework for recognizing 
fundamental rights so as to focus not only on history and tradition, but 
also contemporary legal trends. 
Moreover, the due process claim is likely of greatest utility in the 
gestational surrogacy scenario in which the intended parents are both the 
genetic parents. Where one of the intended parents is not a genetic 
parent—either because a traditional surrogate is involved or a third party 
399. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-122 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.); 
MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2761(3-A) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 50-15-221 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.17 
(West, Westlaw through 2013–2014 legislation); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.088(8) (West, 
Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-25-16.7 (West, Westlaw through 
2014 Reg. Sess.); W.V. CODE ANN. § 16-5-10(e) (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Extraordinary 
Sess.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-1-410(d) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Budget Sess.); P.R. LAWS 
ANN. tit. 31, § 463 (Westlaw through 2011) . 
400. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.04; OR. REV. CODE ANN. § 432.088(9); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-25-13.1. 
401. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-122; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.04, 3111.17; 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-8-57 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, 
§ 463. 
402. Sacramento Nonprofit Collective v. Holder, 855 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1107–08 (E.D. Cal. 
2012); Marin Alliance for Med. Marijuana v. Holder, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1157 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
403. See Mennesson v. France, App. No. 65192/11, (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 26, 2014), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145389; Labassee v. France, App. No. 
65941/11 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 26, 2014), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/ 
search.aspx?i=001-145180. 
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egg donor—courts have held that the non-genetic intended parent’s 
fundamental rights are not at stake since those rights, at least at the 
outset, are not grounded in genetic parentage.404 Moreover, much of the 
“emerging awareness” discussed above with respect to statutory 
developments has involved primarily gestational, not traditional, 
surrogacy.405 
That is not to say that it would be of no use in other scenarios. If, for 
example, a same-sex male couple works with a gestational surrogate, the 
due process claim would result in a declaration of the genetic father’s 
legal parentage and the surrogate’s non-maternity, thus leaving the child 
with one legal parent, the genetic father, who could then consent to 
adoption by his same-sex partner. 
B. The Backstop of Equal Protection 
It is conceivable that if a state law provided both that a surrogate is 
conclusively presumed to be the legal mother of a child she gives birth 
to and that her husband, if she is married, is conclusively presumed to be 
the child’s father, that a court would reject a substantive due process 
challenge to such a statutory scheme. Given the uncertain effect that 
Lawrence had on Glucksberg’s fundamental rights methodology, a court 
might very well hold, following the logic of Michael H., that there is no 
substantive due process right for the child’s genetic parents to challenge 
those presumptions and establish parentage. 
However, it is rare today for a state to rigidly apply both the 
presumptions of maternity and paternity. In particular, in recent decades, 
several states, while maintaining their conclusive presumptions that the 
woman who gives birth to a child is its mother, have made the 
presumption that her husband is the father a rebuttable presumption that 
can be challenged by a person alleging to be the genetic father.406 Thus, 
404. See D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 339 (Fla. 2013); In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386, 392 (N.J. 
Super. App. Div. 2011); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785–86 (Cal. 1993); In re Baby M, 537 
A.2d 1227, 1253–54 (N.J. 1988). This is not to say that the non-biological intended parent never 
obtains this fundamental right vis-à-vis the child, but until his or her legal parentage is established 
via adoption or by other means, it is the genetic parents whose right to care, custody, and control is 
at issue. 
405. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-801 to 8-813 (providing a statutory scheme for 
recognizing gestational surrogacy agreements while leaving traditional surrogacy agreements 
unregulated); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 1–75 (same); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 126.710–
126.810 (same); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1 to 168-B:21 (same); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78b-
15-801 to 78b-15-809 (same). 
406. See Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Between Custody and 
Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 622–23 (2009). 
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in these states, when a child is born to a surrogate, the law is such that 
the intended father can establish his parentage while the intended mother 
cannot, despite the fact that both of them are the genetic parents. In these 
circumstances, courts have held that it violates the Equal Protection 
Clause to treat men and women differently in this way.407 Thus, even if 
due process does not require a state to soften its rigid presumptions of 
maternity and paternity, once it relaxes one of those presumptions, the 
Equal Protection Clause requires it to equally relax the other, which has 
the effect of allowing intended parents to establish legal parentage. 
Where the situation involves same-sex rather than opposite-sex 
parents, there are a few ways in which the equal protection doctrine can 
similarly be invoked to require the state to allow them to establish their 
legal parentage. First, where same-sex female couples are involved, it is 
sometimes the case that one woman will serve as the gestational mother 
using the eggs of her partner.408 In this circumstance, courts have held 
that to the extent the state allows a genetic father to file a declaration of 
paternity, it is sex-based discrimination in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause not to likewise allow the gestating mother’s female 
partner to file a declaration of maternity, resulting in both women being 
treated as legal mothers.409 
Second, to the extent that a state’s statutory scheme permits opposite-
sex couples to establish legal parentage of a child born to a surrogate 
even when one of them is not genetically related to the child but denies 
that right to same-sex couples, such a law is subject to challenge on the 
ground that it discriminates against the latter on the basis of sexual 
orientation.410 It would thus be subject to what appears to be an evolving 
form of “heightened” scrutiny that the Court has applied to such 
classifications.411 
407. These courts alternatively apply either the intermediate scrutiny associated with sex 
discrimination or the strict scrutiny on the theory that the fundamental rights to procreate or to care, 
custody, and control are involved. See J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1270, 1294 (D. Utah 
2002); T.V. v. N.Y. Dep’t of Health, 929 N.Y.S.2d 139, 150–53 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); Soos v. 
Superior Court of Maricopa, 897 P.2d 1356, 1359–61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). But see In re T.J.S., 16 
A.3d at 391–97 (applying heightened scrutiny but concluding that it satisfies that scrutiny). In some 
instances, courts have so interpreted their statutory schemes to avoid the constitutional issue. See In 
re Paternity and Maternity of Infant R., 922 N.E.2d 59, 60–62, 62 n.4 (Ind. App. 2010); In re 
Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 119–26 (Md. 2007). 
408. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675 (Cal. 2005). 
409. See In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 689–90 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2009). 
410. See D.M.T., 129 So. 3d at 341–44 (citing In re Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 92 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2010)). 
411. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring); SmithKline 
Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 479–84 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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Finally, the discrimination can be litigated from the standpoint of the 
children whose interest in having their legal parentage established. The 
Supreme Court has applied intermediate scrutiny to laws that 
discriminate on the basis of illegitimacy and that discriminate against the 
children of illegal aliens, reasoning that it is unjust for children to suffer 
legal disadvantages for a status over which they have no control.412 And 
by analogy, children of same-sex couples have no control over their 
status as such, and thus discrimination against them should likewise be 
subject to heightened scrutiny, even if discrimination against the parents 
based on sexual orientation is entitled only to rational basis scrutiny. 
CONCLUSION 
The desire to procreate and raise children is an innate part of human 
nature, such that the efforts of states such as Washington and a handful 
of other states to prevent people otherwise unable to procreate from 
becoming parents via compensated surrogacy is doomed to failure. I, 
like countless people before and after me, have found ways to 
circumvent these anachronistic anti-surrogacy laws. 
By targeting an innate part of human nature, these laws infringe upon 
two of the oldest and most fundamental protected constitutional rights: 
the rights to procreate and to care, custody, and control of one’s 
children. Although Washington and other states certainly have an 
interest in regulating the practice of surrogacy for the purpose of 
furthering the well-being of surrogates, intended parents, and the 
children born of those relationships, the substantive gloss on the Due 
Process Clause does not allow them to deny people the ability to 
exercise these fundamental rights by means of prohibition, nor does it 
allow states to discourage the practice by placing barriers in the way of 
intended parents who seek to establish legal parentage of children born 
via surrogacy. 
 
412. See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1983) (noting that heightened scrutiny applies to 
illegitimacy classifications, reasoning that it is unjust to punish children for their parent’s conduct); 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (applying heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate 
against children of illegal aliens, employing the same logic). 
 
                                                     
